Sex, Shame, and the Law: An Economic Perspective on Megan\u27s Law by Teichman, Doron
Law & Economics Working Papers
Law & Economics Working Papers Archive:
2003-2009
University of Michigan Law School Year 2004
Sex, Shame, and the Law: An Economic
Perspective on Megan’s Law
Doron Teichman
University of Michigan Law School, doron.teichman@mail.huji.ac.il
This paper is posted at University of Michigan Law School Scholarship Repository.
http://repository.law.umich.edu/law econ archive/art26




JOHN M. OLIN CENTER FOR LAW & ECONOMICS 
 
 
SEX, SHAME, AND THE LAW:  























THIS PAPER CAN BE DOWNLOADED WITHOUT CHARGE AT: 
 
MICHIGAN JOHN M. OLIN WEBSITE 




Published by University of Michigan Law School Scholarship Repository, 2004







The legal system does not function in a vacuum. Different acts that are governed 
by legal rules are also governed by social norms. These social norms are in many cases 
enforced by a set of nonlegal sanctions, which include internal sanctions such as guilt, 
and external sanctions such as refusals to interact with the offender. This article focuses 
on the general question how should policymakers aiming to minimize the cost of 
sanctioning utilize legal and nonlegal sanctions when designing a system of criminal 
sanctions. More specifically, this article will analyze the current trend in different 
jurisdictions in the United States to publicize the names of convicted sex offenders.  
 
Social norms and nonlegal sanctions have been studied by law and economics 
scholars for many years. Initially, this inquiry focused on the unique characteristics of 
nonlegal systems within closely-knit societies and the possibilities of private ordering,1 
and has broadened to issues related to public law. 2 More recently, this literature has 
turned to develop more general theories as to the origin of social norms,3 and the 
relationship between social norms and the law. 4 The combined power of these studies 
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1  See, e.g., Steven N. S. Cheung, The Fable of the Bees: An Economic Investigation, 16 J. LEGAL STUD. 11 
(1973); Robert C. Ellickson, ORDER WITHOUT LAW (1991); Avner Grief, Contract Enforceability and 
Economic Institutions in Early Trade: The Maghribi Traders’ Coalition, 83 AMER. ECON. REV. 535 (1993); 
Mark D. West, Private Ordering at the World’s First Future Exchange , 98 MICH. L. REV. 2574 (2000); 
Lisa Bernstein, Opting Out of the Legal System: Extralegal Contractual Relations in the Diamond Industry, 
21 J. LEGAL STUD. 115 (1992) [hereinafter, Bernstein, Diamond Industry]; Lisa Bernstein, Private 
Commercial Law in the Cotton Industry: Creating Cooperation Through Rules, Norms, and Institutions, 99 
MICH. L. REV. 1724 (2001) [hereinafter, Bernstein, Cotton Industry].  
 
2 See, e.g., Richard L. Hasen, Voting Without Law?, 144 U. PA. L. REV. 2135 (1996); Cass R. Sunstein, 
Social Norms and Social Roles, 96 COLUM. L. REV. 903 (1996); Niva Elkin-Koren, Copyrights in 
Cyberspace – Rights Without Laws? 73 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 1155 (1998). 
 
3 See, e.g., Richard McAdams, The Origin, Development, and Regulation of Norms, 96 MICH. L.  REV. 338 
(1997); Robert Cooter, Decentralized Law for a Complex Economy: The Structural Approach to 
Adjudicating the New Law Merchant, 144 PA. U. L. REV. 1643 (1996); Eric Posner, LAW AND SOCIAL 
NORMS (2000). 
 
4 McAdams, id. at 391-432; Eric Posner, Law, Economics, and Inefficient Norms, 144 U. PA. L. REV. 1697, 
1725-36 (1996); Lawrence Lessig, Social Meaning and Social Norms, 144 U. PA. L. REV.  2181 (1996); 
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SEX, SHAME, AND THE LAW 2 
demonstrates the seriousness with which law and economics scholars treat social norms 
and nonlegal sanctions.5 
 
One of the current debates regarding nonlegal sanctions is to what extent should 
legally induced nonlegal sanctions, such as shaming, be used in order to punish criminals. 
At one end of this debate, stand scholars such as Massaro and Whitman, who argue that 
nonlegal sanctions are either ineffective or morally repugnant and therefore should not be 
used.6 At the other end of this debate, stand scholars such as Kahan and Eric Posner, who 
argue that nonlegal sanctions may be an efficient and politically viable sanctioning tool.7 
This Article sides with the later, yet turns to incorporate into this debate additional 
economic insights. More specifically, it will demonstrate that policymakers cannot 
substitute legal sanctions with nonlegal sanctions while holding the level of nonlegal 
sanctions equal, since the level of each of these is expected to affect the other. For 
example, a reduced legal sanction might cause the public to perceive a certain crime as 
less severe, and cause a reduction in nonlegal sanctions. Thus, tailoring an efficient 
regime that combines legal and nonlegal sanctions might be more difficult than 
previously perceived.  
 
A specific example that I will focus my attention on in this Article is the treatment 
of sex offenders in the United States. Since the 1990s, every state in the country has 
enacted some form of a Sex Offender Registration and Notification Law (SORNL). 
These laws create a regime that disseminates to the public information about convicted 
sex offenders, such as their name and home address. Generally, these laws were enacted 
in order to assist the public to protect itself from the threat of repeat sex offenders. 
Nevertheless, ever since their enactment, a large number of commentators have argued 
that the true effect of these laws is punitive.8 These scholars focused on the harsh 
nonlegal sanctions triggered by these laws, which include, among other things, physical 
attacks on offenders and their property, denial of housing, and termination of 
employment. Building on the theoretical framework developed in this Article, I will 
argue that the actual effects of SORNLs are punitive and thus they should be viewed as a 
                                                                                                                                                 
Cass R. Sunstein, On the Expressive Function of the Law, 144 U. PA. L. REV.  2021 (1996); and Robert 
Cooter, Expressive Law and Economics, 27 J. LEGAL STUD. 585 (1998). 
 
5 An overview of the economic analysis of social norms can be found in Eric Posner's study of the issue. 
See Posner, supra  note 3. 
 
6 Toni M. Massaro, Shame, Culture, and American Criminal Law, 89 MICH. L. REV. 1880 (1991); James Q. 
Whitman, What Is Wrong with Inflicting Shame Sanctions? , 107 YALE L. J. 1055 (1998). 
 
7 Dan Kahan , What do Alternative Sanctions Mean? , 63 U. CHI. L. REV. 591 (1996); Dan Kahan & Eric 
Posner, Shaming White-Collar Criminal: A Proposal for Reform of the Federal Sentencing Guidelines, 42 
J. L. & ECON. 365 (1999). 
 
8 See, e.g ., Caroline Lousie Lewis, The Jacob Wetterling Crimes Against Children and Sexually Violent 
Offender Registration Act: An Unconstitutional Deprivation of the Right to Privacy and Substantive Due 
Process, 31 HARV. C.R. – C.L. L. REV. 89 (1996); Jane A. Small, Who are the People in your 
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form of punishment. The second claim I will make is that using SORNLs in order to 
punish sex offenders might be an efficient way to sanction sex offenders. Adopting the 
punitive approach towards SORNLs will, however, require a change of attitude towards 
these laws.   
 
This article is organized as follows: Section II makes the general case for the use 
of nonlegal sanctions as a punitive tool. It points out the potential efficiencies and 
inefficiencies of using legal and nonlegal sanctions and presents the potential interactions 
between the two. Section III turns to the specific case study of sanctioning sex offenders, 
and will analyze the social phenomena triggered by SORNLs from an economic 
perspective. In Section IV I will build on my findings regarding the actual effects of 
SORNLs to make several policy recommendations. Finally, Section V makes some 
concluding remarks and suggestions for future research. 
 
II. NONLEGAL SANCTIONS AS AN ALTERNATIVE SANCTIONING 
TECHNOLOGY 
 
In this Section I will set out the case for the use of nonlegal sanctions as an 
alternative to costly legal sanctions. I will begin by defining what the nonlegal sanctions I 
am referring to are, and by exploring some of the forces that explain their existence. 
Then, I will present the economic case for the use of legally induced nonlegal sanctions, 
and argue that the arguments made against the use of these sanctions, while important, do 
not justify forgoing their use. At that point, I will turn to develop a model of combining 
legal and nonlegal sanctions. The distinguishing factor of this model, when compared to 
existing models, is that it incorporates the potential effects of changes in the level of legal 
sanctions on the level of nonlegal sanctions. Finally, I will demonstrate how nonlegal 
sanctions can affect the level of legal sanctions through the sentencing and plea 
bargaining processes. Proofs of the claims made in this Section are provided in the 
Appendix. 
 
1. A Theory of Nonlegal Sanctions   
In recent years courts and legislatures have turned to inducing nonlegal sanctions 
as an alternative to imprisonment. The names of patrons of prostitutes are published in 
newspapers.9 Individuals convicted of driving under the influence of alcohol are required 
to use special license plates or bumper stickers.10 Offenders are ordered to wear t-shirts 
that announce their crimes.11 Courts instruct offenders to appear in public and describe 
the crimes they were convicted of and apologize for them. 12 These measures sanction 
                                                 
9 See Courtney Guyton Persons, Sex In the Sunlight: The Effectiveness, Efficiency, Constitutionality, and 
Advisability of Publishing Names and Pictures of Prostitutes' Patrons, 49 VAND. L. REV. 1525 (1996); 
Stephen P. Garvey, Can Shaming Punishments Educate?, 65 U. CHI. L. REV. 733, 735 n12 (1998). 
 
10 See Note, The Bumper Sticker: The Innovation that Failed, 22 NEW ENG. L. REV. 643 (1988).  
 
11 Kahan, supra  note 7 at 632 and references made there. 
 
12 Id. at 633 and references made there; Massaro, supra  note 6 at 1888-9. 
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wrongdoers by disseminating information about their past criminal activity. This 
dissemination is expected to have two distinct adverse effects on the sanctioned 
individuals. First, it will cause them negative feelings ranging from mild embarrassment 
to severe shame.13 This is the internal aspect of nonlegal sanctions. Second, it might 
trigger sanctions that are inflicted to the criminal by other members of the community, 
such as cutting off relationships, termination of employment, and even violent retaliation. 
This is the external aspect of nonlegal sanctions. 
 
The fact that humans feel discomfort when wrongful acts they committed are 
revealed to the public is intuitive, and requires little explaining. Yet the tendency of 
individuals to sanction wrongdoers does require some explaining, since inflicting 
sanctions is costly, 14 while the benefits created by sanctions, such as deterrence, are 
enjoyed by the general public.15 Therefore, individuals will apply a sanction to other 
individuals only when the personal benefits they gain from applying the sanction exceed 
the cost of applying the sanction. 16  
 
The cost of inflicting nonlegal sanctions depends on the kind of sanction. In the 
context of passive sanctions, such as cutting off the relationship with the wrongdoer, the 
cost is the forgone opportunity of interacting with the wrongdoer.17 Once we move into 
more active sanctions, such as shaming, the costs of sanctioning become more explicit 
and include, for example, the time and mental resources that are put into sanctioning, and 
the risk that the sanctioned party will choose to retaliate. More extreme sanctions, such as 
the use of violence, might generate an additional cost in the form of potential legal 
liability.  
 
                                                 
13 For an analytical discussion of the distinction among these different feelings see, e.g., June Price 
Tangney et. al, Are Shame, Guilt and Embarrassment Distinct Emotions? , 70 J.  PERSONALITY & SOC. 
PSYCH. 1256 (1996). Although many pages of psychological journals have been dedicated to this 
distinction it is of little consequence to the discussion here. My focus is on causing disutility to wrongdoers 
and the specific psychological definition of this disutility will not affect the results of the discussion. 
 
14 See Richard A. Posner, THE ECONOMICS OF JUSTICE, 211 (1981) (pointing out that in the absence of 
compensation an individual must derive utility from a vengeful act in order to be motivated to commit it). It 
should be noted that some scholars that dealt with the question of the creation of nonlegal sanctions have 
argued that nonlegal sanctions are created on the basis of a costless mechanism. See Richard H. McAdams, 
supra note 3 at 355. In his analysis McAdams focuses on withholding esteem as a costless basis on which 
nonlegal sanctions are build. Yet since even withholding esteem requires some action on part of the 
individuals that are doing the withholding it would seem that such a sanction does require the individuals 
who inflict it to bear at least some costs. Hence, we cannot resolve the cost benefit analysis by assuming 
that there is no cost. 
 
15 See McAdams, id. at 352-53. 
 
16 As we shall see this benefit can also be in the form of avoiding a harm that will be inflicted on the 
individual if he does not participate in the act of sanctioning.  
 
17  To be sure, the termination of long-term relationship might cause the parties significant monetary costs, 
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Turning to the reasons for sanctioning, individuals who inflict nonlegal sanctions 
incur several distinct benefits. The first is the fulfillment of a preference for 
sanctioning.18 More specifically, I am referring to the existence of a preference for 
reciprocity. 19 The preference for reciprocity has been demonstrated in a long line of 
experiments of ultimatum games, in which participants willingly endured monetary costs 
in order to sanction individuals who treated them in a way that they perceived to be 
unfair.20 The presence of a preference for reciprocity can be explained by evolutionary 
models that illustrate why mutants that have a preference for reciprocity have higher 
reproductive success,21 and by game theory models suggesting that players can maximize 
their personal payoffs in repeated games by adopting a strategy based on reciprocity. 22 To 
be sure, the preference for reciprocity is not limited to the direct victim of the wrongful 
act. Rather, concrete examples of nonlegal sanctions 23 and stylised experiments24 
                                                 
18 Ernst Fehr & Simon Gächter, Altruistic Punishment in Humans, 415 NATURE  137 (2002) (presenting data 
supporting the hypothesis that emotions are an important factor behind the act of punishing others). 
 
19 For a review of the economics of reciprocity see generally Ernst Fehr & Armin Falk, Psychological 
Foundations of Incentives, 46 EURO. ECON. REV. 687, 689-704 (2002).   
 
20 The first experiments evaluating behavior in ultimatum games were reported in Werner Guth, Rolf 
Schmittbeger & Bernd Schwarze, An Experimental Analysis of Ultimatum Bargaining, 3 J. ECON. BEHAV. 
& ORG. 367 (1982). For an updated review of ultimatum game studies see generally Werner Guth, On 
Ultimatum Bargaining Experiments - A Personal Review, 27 J. ECON. BEHAV. & ORG. 329 (1995); Richard 
H. Thaler, THE WINNER’S CURSE 21-35 (1992). 
 
21 Werner Guth & Menahem E. Yaari, Explaining Reciprocal Behavior in Simple Strategic Games: An 
Evolutionary Approach , in: EXPLAINING PROCESS AND CHANGE – APPROACHES TO EVOLUTIONARY 
ECONOMICS 23 (Ulrich Witt ed., 1992); Steffen Huck & Jorg Oechssler, The Indirect Evolutionary 
Approach to Explaining Fair Allocations, 28 GAMES & ECON. BEHAV. 13 (1999). 
 
22 Robert Axelrod, THE EVOLUTION OF COOPERATION 27-54 (1984) (showing how a reciprocal strategy can 
lead to higher payoffs for a player in a repeated prisoners’ dilemma). 
 
23 Consumer boycotts, at times, serve the purpose of expressing disapproval of wrongful acts that harm 
others. See: Monroe Friedman, CONSUMER BOYCOTTS 12-13 (1999). An historical example of such an 
expressive nonlegal sanction is the Jewish boycott against German goods during World War II. The goal of 
participating in this boycott was to allow American Jews to take some action, futile as it might be, rather 
than do nothing. See: William Orbach, Shattering the Shackles of Powerlessness: The Debate Surrounding 
the Anti-Nazi Boycott of 1933-41, 2 MODERN JUDAISM 149, 161-66 (1982)). Nevertheless it should be 
noted that participation in this boycott was driven by other forces as well (see infra note 25). 
 
24 Daniel Kahenman, Jack L. Knetsch & Richard L. Thaler, Fairness and the Assumptions of Economics, 59 
J. OF BUSINESS, S285, S290-S292 (1986). In the first stage of this experiment participants plaid a variation 
of the ultimatum game in which the alocator needed to divide between hims elf and a recipient $20. The 
alocator was able to divide the $20 either equally or by allocating $18 to himself and allocating $2 to the 
recipient. In the second stage of the game participants were asked to choose between receiving a payoff of 
$12 that was to be shared equally with a player that chose to allocate $18 to himself in the first round and 
receiving a payoff of $10 that was to be shared equally with a player that chose to allocate $10 to himself in 
the first round. Thus, the players in the second round were asked to give up one dollar in order to sanction a 
player that acted unfairly in the first round towards another individual. The results of the experiment were 
clear - 74% of the players in the second round chose to sacrifice their monetary well being in order to 
sanction individuals that treated other players unfairly. See also Ernst Fehr, Urs Fischbacher & Simon 
6
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demonstrate that individuals also hold a preference for sanctioning individuals who 
treated other members of society unfairly.  
 
A second benefit of nonlegal sanctions is that participating in acts of sanctioning 
can induce positive reactions from others and vice-versa – not participating in acts of 
sanctioning may trigger negative reactions from others. In other words, in some situations 
there exists a social norm, which is enforced by a separate set of nonlegal sanctions, that 
requires one to sanction wrongdoers. For instance, individuals who refuse to participate 
in a consumer boycott might be sanctioned for their refusal.25 The existence of a 
sanctioning norm can be explained by the signaling model of social norms.26 In this 
model, individuals are either “co-operators” who care about future payoffs (have a low 
discount rate), or “cheaters” who care about present payoffs (have a high discount rate). 
Both types of players are situated in a repeated game in which co-operators maximize 
their payoffs by interacting among themselves. In order to achieve this goal, co-operators 
can use costly signals that only individuals who expect the high cooperative payoff can 
afford to send.27 Within this framework the cost incurred by the sanctioning party is 
                                                                                                                                                 
Gächter, Strong Reciprocity, Human Cooperation and the Enforcement of Social Norms, 13 HUM. NATURE 
- AN INTERDISC. BIOSOCIAL PERSP . 1, 16-17 (2002). 
 
25 See Sankar Sen, Zeynep Gurhan-Canli & Vicki Morwitz, Withholding Consumption: A Social Dilemma 
Perspective on Consumer Boycotts, 28 J. CONSUMER RESEARCH 399, 401 (pointing out the connection 
between consumer boycotts and group membership); Dennis E. Garrett, Consumer Boycotts: Are Targets 
Always the Bad Guys, 58 BUS. & SOC. REV. 17, 19-21 (1986) (pointing out the moral problems associated 
with consumer boycotts). For specific examples See, e.g., Friedman, supra  note 23 at 136 (describing how 
the Jewish boycott against German goods during World War II was rigorously enforced by nonlegal 
sanctions); W. Muraskin, The Harlem Boycott of 1934: Black Nationalism and the Rise of Labor-Union 
Consciousness, 13 LABOR HISTORY 361, 364 (1972) (presenting a case in which the photographs of boycott 
violators were published in a local newspaper).   
 
26 The relation between signaling and social norms has been extensively examined and thus I will explain 
the nature of the signaling mo del in the text above only briefly. For further analysis see Eric A. Posner, 
Symbols, Signals, and Social Norms in Politics and the Law, 27 J. LEGAL STUD. 765 (1998) [hereinafter: 
Posner, Symbols], and Posner, supra  note 3 at 11-35. It should be noted that the signaling model of social 
norms is not the exclusive explanation for the existence of a sanctioning norm. Recently, Mahoney and 
Sanchirico presented a game theoretic analysis of strategies in a repeated prisoners dilemma, which offered 
an alternative explanation for the existence of a sanctioning norm. In their paper Mahoney and Sanchirico 
introduce a game strategy – def-for-dev (defect-for deviate), which has the practical effect of requiring from 
parties to sanction defectors, and views those who do not do so as deviators that should be sanctioned. 
Thus, according to this model, if individuals do not have exceptionally high discount rates they will 
participate in the act of sanctioning in accordance with the social norm requiring them to do so. See Paul G. 
Mahoney & Chris W. Sanchirico, Norms, Repeated Games, and the Role of Law, UNIVERSITY OF VIRGINIA 
SCHOOL OF LAW 2002 LAW & ECONOMICS RESEARCH PAPER SERIES, WORKING PAPER NO. 02-3 (2002) at 
http://ssrn.com/abstract_id=311879. 
 
27 To illustrate this description it might be useful to view the numerical example presented in Posner, 
Symbols, id. at 769-70. In this example the world is divided to “senders” and “receivers” that can interact 
among themselves. Both senders and receivers are composed out of “co-operators” and “cheaters”. In the 
game a cooperating receiver needs to decide whether to deal with a sender. The players in Posner’s 
cooperation game face the following payoffs: If the receiver does not cooperate with the sender the payoff 
for the sender and the receiver is $0. If the receiver cooperates and the sender is a cheater the sender will 
cheat and gain $2 while the receiver will lose $2. Finally, if the receiver will cooperate and the sender is a 
7
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precisely what makes the infliction of the nonlegal sanction a credible signal. Individuals 
who do not participate in the act of sanctioning are perceived as non-co-operators, and 
find it difficult to interact with members of the sanctioning group. Furthermore, since 
nonlegal sanctions have content, in the sense that they express disapproval of the 
wrongful act, they might have a cost structure in which signaling is more costly for 
cheaters. Such a cost structure will render superior signals since it will reduce the amount 
of resources spent on signaling.28 
 
The last force that might bring people to change the ir attitude towards wrongdoers 
for the worse is the discovery that the wrongdoer is a type of person who tends to commit 
wrongful acts. This will be the case if past wrongful acts can serve as a proxy for future 
wrongful acts. Thus, quite naturally, once members of society learn of the specific risks 
associated with dealing with the wrongdoer, they will internalise this new information 
into the decision of how to interact with him in the future. For example, once it is 
discovered that a business partner has a higher probability of breach than was previously 
perceived in the marketplace, the value of the contracts offered by this individual will 
diminish, and from his perspective he will suffer from a nonlegal sanction.  
 
Having identified the three forces driving the creation of nonlegal sanctions, 
namely, preferences, sanctioning norms, and prevention, I can now introduce an 
analytical distinction between the different types of nonlegal sanctions. The term 
nonlegal sanctions is broad and includes any reduction in the welfare of the wrongdoer as 
result of the discovery that he committed the wrongful act. The term punishment, on the 
other hand, is narrower and only refers to the reduction in the welfare of the wrongdoer 
that is associated with achieving a normative goal such as retribution or deterrence.29 
Viewed from this perspective, the first two categories of nonlegal sanctions should be 
viewed as a form of punishment since they inflict suffering to wrongdoers on account of 
their past behavior and by doing so they fulfil a societal need for retribution and 
deterrence. Preventative nonlegal sanctions, however, should not be viewed as a form of 
punishment. From a reciprocal perspective, such sanctions do not balance past accounts 
but rather reflect a forward looking decision. From a deterrence perspective, in many 
                                                                                                                                                 
co-operator they will both gain a payoff of $6. Posner further assumes that there is some random act, say, 
saluting the flag, which costs both parties $3 and that receivers believe that indicates cooperation. Under 
these assumptions a separating equilibrium may emerge in which the receiver will cooperate with players 
who salutes the flag, and will refuse to deal with players who do not salute the flag. Under such a strategy 
cheaters will not be able to deal with the co-operator since their payoff of $2 is insufficient to cover the cost 
of the signal, and they will prefer not to deal and gain $0 rather than signal and remain with a net payoff of 
$-1. On the other hand co-operators that earn $6 can afford to send a signal at the cost of $3. 
28 In the terms of the numerical example presented in the previous note assume that the cost of the signal is 
still $3 for cheaters but only $1 for co-operators. Such a signal is superior since it allows the creation of a 
separating equilibrium at a lower cost. 
 
29 In addition, as a practical matter there might be a minimal threshold of welfare loss that is required in 
order to enter the realm of punishment. Given the legal implications of the definition of punishment such a 
threshold might be useful in order to prevent litigation surrounding policies that while analytically might be 
viewed as a punishment do not create a significant burden on the lives of wrongdoers. 
8
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cases these sanctions reflect future harms that the wrongdoer might cause, and therefore 
should not be viewed as part of his punishment.30  
 
2. Nonlegal Sanctions as a Substitute for Costly Legal Sanctions  
At the outset of presenting my argument a clarifying comment as to the scope of 
this project should be made. This Article deals exclusively with the question how should 
sanctions be inflicted and not why they should be inflicted. It is at this point, that 
economic analysis can make a separate contribution, and point the most efficient 
sanctioning techniques given any exogenous political decision as to the size of the 
required sanction. Thus, one might hold a retributionist view towards the goal criminal 
sanctions and agree with the analysis presented here.  
 
From an economic perspective the basic argument underlying the shift to nonlegal 
sanctions is the proposition that policymakers should use the most cost effective form of 
punishment.31 For instance, economists have been arguing for a long time that 
policymakers should use fines, which are a cheap punishment, rather than costly non-
monetary sanctions such as imprisonment.32 Similarly, if one can inflict the same amount 
of pain to the sanctioned individual through imprisonment or through a nonlegal sanction, 
one should choose to use the sanctioning technology that is cheaper to administer.33  In 
fact, budget crises around the nation have led states and counties to realize that they 
simply cannot afford to continue using imprisonment at the levels they have grown 
accustomed to.34 
                                                 
30 For example, after a wrongdoer caused an accident by driving recklessly his insurance premiums might 
rise. This rise is similar to preventative nonlegal sanctions since it reflects the insurance company 
reassessing its contractual relationship with the wrongdoer given the new information about the wrongdoer. 
Yet notice that the rise in premiums reflects precisely (in a competitive insurance market) the rise in 
expected losses of the wrongdoer. Thus, this additional sanction, while painful from the perspective of the 
wrongdoer, should not affect the calculation of the optimal sanction. 
31 See Steven Shavell, Criminal Law and the Optimal Use of Nonmonetary Sanctions as a Deterrent, 85 
COLUM. L.  REV. 1232, 1236 (1985) (defining the social welfare problem). For an alternative view on 
shaming sanctions see generally Garvey, supra note 9 (presenting an educating model of shaming). 
 
32 See, e.g.,  Gary Becker, Crime and Punishment: An Economic Approach , 76 J. POL. ECON. 169, 193-98 
(1968) (arguing that fines should be used whenever feasible); Richard A. Posner, Optimal Sentences for 
White Collar Criminals, 17 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 409, 410 (1980) (arguing that white collar criminals should 
be sanctioned by fines rather than by imprisonment); Shavell, id. at 1236-1241 (arguing that nonmonetary 
sanctions should be used only after a fine equaling the offender’s wealth has been used).  
 
33 See, e.g., Kahan & Posner, supra note 7 at 367-8 (arguing that “shaming could prove to be an efficient 
alternative to prison for white-collar offenders”); Garvey, supra  note 9 at 738 (noting that “at a t ime when 
the costs of imprisonment consume ever larger shares of state budgets, shame may serve as a politically 
viable and cost effective way of achieving deterrence, specific and general, as well as of satisfying the 
legitimate demands of retribution”). Even scholars who raise fierce opposition to the use of shame 
punishments concede the fact that these sanctions are cheaper than imprisonment. See Toni M. Massaro, 
Meanings of Shame Implications for Legal Reform, PSYCHOL. PUB. POL’Y & L. 645, 649 (1997) (noting 
that shaming “is plainly cheaper than imprisonment”). 
 
34 See, e.g.,  V. Dion Haynes & Vincent J. Schodolski, Strapped States Turn to Prisons Early Releases 
Among Saving Options, CHI. TRIB., May 5, 2003, at 8 (reporting that inmates in Los Angeles county were 
released from jail in order to save $17 million); Scott Kraus, 100 Inmates Granted Early Release. 
9
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In order to analyze the optimal use of legal and nonlegal sanctions one must have 
an understanding of the costs of using them. In this Article I assume that the cost of 
producing both legal and nonlegal sanctions is marginally increasing. In other words, 
each additional unit of disutility inflicted to offenders will be more costly than the 
previous unit using one of the two sanctioning technologies. This assumption is quite 
standard in economic analysis, and is synonymous with social rationality.  
 
More specifically, this assumption is realistic with respect to legal sanctions since 
when viewing these sanctions we can see how they progress in a manner that reflects 
increasing marginal costs. Minor criminal activity is in many cases sanctioned by the 
imposition of fines, which are a socially cheap (if not costless) sanction. More severe 
crimes are in many cases sanctioned by the imposition of parole and community service, 
which are more costly. It is only after these cheaper sanctioning modes fail, that 
governments generally turn to costlier methods of sanctioning, such as imprisonment.  
 
Similarly, inflicting and inducing nonlegal sanctions reflect a picture of 
marginally increasing costs. With respect to the former, Ellickson’s description of the 
scale of nonlegal sanctions used in Shasta County might serve as a useful illustration. 
This scale includes nonlegal sanctions that rise from negative gossip, through threats of 
violence, and end up in the use of actual violence.35 Arguably, the costs of the sanctions 
on this scale are marginally increasing. As to the later, first one should notice that despite 
the fact that one might think that nonlegal sanctions come at no cost to governments, 
inducing nonlegal sanctions does create costs. In the context of SORNLs, for example, 
these costs include the costs of setting up notification websites, updating these websites, 
tracking down offenders, and actively notifying communities.36 In fact, the current budget 
crisis in many states has caused some of them to limit the resource they expend on such 
projects.37 As to the way states structure the costs of inducing nonlegal sanctions, one can 
                                                                                                                                                 
Northampton County Says Crowding, Budget Cuts Led to Move, ALLENTOWN MORNING CALL, April 12, 
2003, at B1 (reporting that 100 inmates in Northampton County were released due to budget constraints); 
Mark R. Chellgren, Kentucky to Release Felons Early Move to Help Corrections Department Balance 
Budget, EVANSVILLE COURIER & PRESS, Dec. 18, 2002, at B12 (reporting that Kentucky Governor, Paul 
Patton, decided to release over 550 prison inmates due to the states budget crisis). It should be noted that 
the Kentucky program, which was probably the most publicized one in the nation, was eventually 
abandoned after two released inmates were arrested and charged with bank robbery and rape. See AP, 
Patton to End Early Release Program, EVANSVILLE COURIER & PRESS, Feb. 1, 2003, at B3. 
35 Ellickson, supra  note 1 at 56-9. 
 
36 See, e.g., Carol L. Kunz, Toward Dispassionate, Effective Control of Sexual Offenders, 47 AM. U. L. 
REV. 453, 480-1 (1997) (assessing the costs of SORNLs); Julia A. Houston, Note, Sex Offender 
Registration Acts: An Added Dimension to the War on Crime, 28 GA. L. REV. 729, 732-3 (1994) (pointing 
out problems of implementing SORNLs associated with their costs); Alex B. Eyssen, Does Community 
Notification for Sex Offenders Violate the Eighth Amendment’s Prohibition Against Cruel and Unusual 
Punishment? A Focus on Vigilantism Resulting from “Megan’s Law”, 33 ST . MARY’S L. J. 101, 117 
(reporting that in Dallas, Texas, more than one hundred officers had spent four days verifying sex 
offender’s addresses). 
 
37 See, e.g ., Scott Milfred, Jobs that Deal With Sex Offenders Cut; The State Department of Corrections has 
Eliminated the Positions to Save Money, THE CAPITAL TIMES & WIS. ST . J., July 13, 2003 at A1 (describing 
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again see a scale ranging from low cost shaming using bumper stickers and distribution 
of flyers, to costly measures such as personal notification conducted by officers to every 
household in a certain area.38  
 
Having set out my assumption as to the cost of sanctioning, I can now turn to state 
the condition for using legal and nonlegal sanctions efficiently. Generally, the cost of 
sanctioning will be minimized when the marginal cost of inflicting legal sanctions equals 
the marginal cost of inflicting nonlegal sanctions. To understand why, consider the 
decision of a policymaker who is trying to achieve a given total sanction. Suppose that 
initially the policymaker uses only legal sanctions. If the “last” – marginal – unit of the 
legal sanction is very costly, the policymaker can reduce the total cost of sanctioning by 
replacing this unit with one equivalent unit of nonlegal sanction, and choose the type of 
nonlegal sanction that is least expensive. The policymaker can continue to reduce the 
total cost of sanctioning by substituting more units of legal sanctions with units of 
nonlegal sanctions. As the policymaker continues substituting in this manner, the cost 
saving will gradually diminish, since the marginal cost of legal sanctions will gradually 
fall and the marginal cost of nonlegal sanctions will gradually rise. Once the policymaker 
reaches the point in which the marginal costs of legal and nonlegal sanctions are equal, 
additional substitutions will only raise the total cost of sanctioning, since the marginal 
cost of nonlegal sanctions will exceed the marginal cost of legal sanctions. Hence, this 
point reflects the point in which the costs of sanctioning are minimized.39 
                                                                                                                                                 
job cuts in the Wisconsin program due to budget constraints); Denisue M. Bonilla & Joy L. Woodson, 
Continuing Debate Over Megan’s Law. Some Question whether Sex Offender List Curbs Crime. The State 
Statute is Set to Expire Next Year, L. A. TIMES, Feb. 14, 2003 at B2 (California Attorney General pointing 
out that verifying registration would cost the state $15 million to $20 million which is a “hefty request” 
given the California budget deficit); Dayton Kevin, Budget Scenarios Criticized, HONOLULU ADVERTISER, 
Feb. 26, 2002, at A1 (noting that the Hawaiian attorney general was considering to eliminate the states sex 
offender registration program due to budget cuts); Kirk Mitchell, Bill Revamps Sex-Offender List CBI 
would be in Charge of Tracking System, DENV. POST , Jan. 25, 2002, at B1 (reporting that many police 
departments do not check the addresses of sex offenders due to staffing concerns). 
 
38 To be sure, nonlegal sanctions are unique in the sense that by using them the government can externalize 
some of the costs of sanctioning to the public and thus raise the amount of sanctions being inflicted given a 
governmental budget constraint. This is true both from the perspective of the costs of applying the nonlegal 
sanctions themselves, which, quite obviously, are born by the sanctioning public, but it is also true with 
respect to the cost of inducing nonlegal sanctions. For example, in the context of SORNLs some states have 
attempted to externalize the cost of notification to sex offenders. See I.C. § 18-8324 (7) (offender required 
to pay for news paper ads); IOWA CODE §692A.6.1 (offender required to pay registration fee); LA. REV. 
STAT. §15:542 D (same). It should be noted that in Louisiana the state has also imposed the responsibility 
(and costs) of notification on the offenders themselves, see LA. REV. STAT . §15:542 B(1). From an 
economic perspective all of these costs are part of the social costs of sanctioning and should be accounted 
for while developing a theory of efficient sanctioning. 
 
39 To be sure, the problem of minimizing the cost of sanctioning could lead to corner solutions in which the 
optimal result is to use only one of the two sanctioning technologies. This will occur when one of the 
technologies has a positive set up cost (i.e. its marginal cost at the zero sanction point is positive) that is 
higher than the marginal cost of the alternative technology when it is the sole producer of sanctions. For the 
duration of this Article I will only deal with those situations in which a positive amount of both types of 
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A simple numerical example might clarify the argument. Assume that the required 
sanction to a type of criminals is 1,000.40 In table 1 I present a possible cost structure of 
inflicting legal and nonlegal sanctions to such criminals. The first column represents 
increasing levels of legal sanction units with their corresponding cost (C(LS)). Column 
three represents amounts of nonlegal sanctions that combine for a total sanction of 1,000, 
and column four represents their corresponding cost (C(NLS)).41 Finally, the fifth column 







500 100 500 81 181 
600 110 400 68 178 
700 124 300 58 182 
Table 1: The Benchmark Case 
 
When viewing table 1 it becomes apparent that the regime that minimizes the cost of 
sanctioning is the one in which we combine a legal sanction of 600 and a nonlegal 
sanction of 400. If a policymaker will choose to deviate from that combination by 
substituting 100 units of legal sanctions with 100 units of nonlegal sanctions, she will 
save the marginal cost of inflicting legal sanctions - 10 - yet will have to spend an 
additional 13 on nonlegal sanctions for a net loss of 3. If, on the other hand, she will 
choose to deviate by substituting 100 units of nonlegal sanctions with 100 units of legal 
sanctions, she will save the marginal cost of inflicting nonlegal sanctions - 10 - yet will 
have to spend an addit ional 14 on legal sanctions for a net loss of 4. Thus, we can see that 
the cost minimizing combination is the one in which the marginal costs of legal and 
nonlegal sanctions are equal. 
  
In sum, from an economic perspective combining legal and nonlegal sanctions is 
desirable since it can sustain a required level of punishment while creating a social 
surplus. Yet despite this argument several commentators have raised opposition to such a 
policy. Massaro, in an influential article laid out the argument that shaming sanctions 
simply do not work as means to deter crime in modern urbanized societies.42 According 
                                                 
40 All the figures in this example and the examples to come reflect measured “disutility units”. I am aware 
of the potential criticism that such units do not exist and that measuring disutility is a difficult task. 
Nonetheless, this real-world difficulty should not be overstated. Courts and legislatures deal on a daily 
basis with issues that involve great measurement problems and there is no reason to assume that the case of 
nonlegal sanctions is unique from that perspective. 
 
41 Note that the costs of both types of sanctions in the example fulfill the marginally increasing assumption 
meaning that each additional 100 units of either type of sanction units are more costly than the previous 
100 units.   
 
42 See Massaro, supra  note 6 at 1921 (arguing that "[t]he cultural conditions of effective shaming seem 
weakly present, at best, in many contemporary American cities"). See also Norval Morris & Michael 
12
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to this argument shaming sanctions might have been useful historically within closely-
knit communities, but in modern urban society where people do not know each other and 
do not care about the way others perceive them, shaming will not work. It would seem, 
however, that this argument overstates the weakness of shaming sanctions. True, modern 
society is not as closely knit as traditional societies. It is larger, members hold less 
information about each other, and the prospect of repeat dealings with random members 
of the community is quite low. Yet people in modern society continue to live within sub-
communities that do hold the characteristics of closely-knit communities. Family, 
neighbors, and work associates are examples of such sub-communities.43 Thus, although 
one might be indifferent whether a stranger on the street is aware of the fact he used the 
services of a prostitute, one would not want his family members and coworkers to find 
out about this behavior.44  
 
A related argument made against the use of shaming sanctions is that in a diverse 
society, such as modern America, different groups of society are bound to have different 
values, and these will lead to different attitudes towards what constitutes a shameful act.45 
Thus, so the argument goes, while shaming sanctions can be effective in cohesive groups, 
they will not be effective in contemporary America where there is no social consensus as 
to what a shameful act is.46 Furthermore, given these differences among groups, there 
might also be inconsistencies as to what causes people shame.47 For instance, while 
members of one group might find cleaning the streets in a unique outfit to be degrading, 
others might see nothing of it. Yet, again, it would seem that this argument overstates the 
                                                                                                                                                 
Torny, BETWEEN PRISON AND PROBATION: INTERMEDIATE PUNISHMENT IN A RATIONAL SENTENCING 
SYSTEM 5 (1990) (arguing that sanctions based only on stigma “seem more romantic than real in the urban 
agglomerations where crime flourishes”). 
 
43 An extensive literature has been to devoted to the importance of nonlegal sanctions in the context of 
commercial transactions in modern  America. The initial contribution in this context should be attributed to 
Stewart Macaulay, Non-Contractual Relations in Business: A Preliminary Study, 28 AM. SOC. REV. 55 
(1963). For more contemporary studies that dealing with this issue see, e.g., David Charny, Nonlegal 
Sanctions in Commercial Relationships, 104 HARV. L. REV. 375 (1990); Bernstein, Diamond Industry, 
supra  note 1; Bernstein, Cotton Industry, supra  note 1. 
 
44 To be sure, one cannot argue that the nonlegal sanctions that individual face in a modern urban setting 
are just as severe as those in traditional closely-knit societies. Some anecdotal evidence does in fact point 
out that sex offenders are moving to urban areas since the harassment they face in those areas is smaller. 
For example, in Minnesota a disproportionably high number of offenders moved to Minneapolis, which led 
representatives of the city to try to reshape the local SORNL in a way that will force sex offenders out of 
the city. See Wayne A. Logan, Jacob’s Legacy: Sex Offender Registration and Community Notification 
Laws, Practice, and Procedure in Minnesota, 29 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 1287, 1309-11 (2003). Similar 
concerns were raised in New York City. See Daniel M. Filler, Making the Case for Megan's Law: A Case 
Study in Legislative Rhetoric , 76 IND. L. REV. 315, 345 (2001). The point that is made in the text above is 
that in modern urban settings wrongdoers will still face some  nonlegal sanctions. 
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problems of shaming. Even in a diverse culture such as modern America there continues 
to exist some consensus as to acts that are shameful. As we shall see in more detail 
bellow, sex offenses are such an area. 
 
In addition, it has been suggested that criminals, by their very nature, are less 
susceptible to shame and therefore it is counterproductive to shame them. 48 This 
argument seems to overstate the weakness of shame based sanctions for two reasons. 
First, it is not clear what the empirical basis for such a claim is. Second, accepting the 
premise of the claim, one should still note that it focuses on the internal aspects of 
shaming sanctions, while neglecting their external aspects. Even the shameless will want 
to avoid losing central elements of their lives such as family, close friends, employment 
and housing.   
 
A separate argument made by Whitman focuses on the adverse effects of shaming 
sanctions on the sanctioning crowd.49 More specifically, Whitman is concerned that the 
delegation of the act of punishing to the public could stir up public emotions, and create 
an atmosphere of lynch justice.50 Yet again, it is not clear that this concern represents a 
reason to completely abandon shame sanctions. Instead, policymakers should be aware of 
the possibility that such sanctions will get out of hand and take measures to prevent this 
from happening. 51 Prosecution of vigilantes, policing of demonstrations against 
offenders, and harm caused to innocent bystanders, are all costs associated directly with 
shame sanctions that must be incorporated into the cost-benefit calculus.   
 
An additional problem associated with nonlegal sanctions is that they rely on local 
communities and their sanctioning norms, rather than on a central government, to punish 
criminals. Local norms might serve the narrow interests of the community creating them, 
while being inefficient from a broader social perspective.52 For example, communities 
might choose to punish criminals by banishing them.53 Such sanctions are potentially 
inefficient since they create a negative externality, namely, the fact that the criminal will 
                                                 
48 Id. at 1918 (“the people most likely to respond to public shaming sanctions are nonoffender members of 
the audience, not potential offenders”). 




51 Historically, regimes that used shame sanctions were aware of this problem and devoted resources  to 
control the behavior of the sanctioning public. For example, in England during the times when the pillory 
was used, constables made sure that the event would not deteriorate to wild violence. See J. M. Beattie 
CRIME AND THE COURTS IN ENGLAND, 1660-1800, 614-16 (1986). 
 
52 See Posner, supra note 4 at 1720-1 (analyzing the potential inefficiencies of norms that generate negative 
externalities). 
 
53 This seems to be the current case with respect to sex offenders. See, e.g ., Abril R. Bedarf, Examining Sex 
Offender Community Notification Laws, 83 CAL L. REV. 885, 908 (1995)  (noting that “sometimes the 
community outrage and rejection forces the offender out of town”). For a review of the nonlegal sanctions 
suffered by offenders see infra Section III 3.  
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end up in a neighboring community. 54 This again points out that a regime based on 
nonlegal sanctions will have to expend resources on regulating nonlegal sanctions. For 
instance, certain sanctions such as housing discrimination might be found to be 
inefficient since their main goal is to generate negative externalities, and therefore will 
need to be outlawed.55  
 
Another notable argument raised against nonlegal sanctions is that stigmatizing 
individuals might drive these individuals to commit additional crimes.56 This argument 
relies on the insight of criminologists that labeling individuals as deviants might cause 
them to drift away from society into a life within criminal subcultures or a life of solitary 
deviance.57 Alternatively, this argument can build upon recent studies in social 
psychology that demonstrate the self- fulfilling aspects of stereotypes and stigmas.58 
According to these studies stereotypes might create a psychological burden that will 
                                                 
54 See Doron Teichman, The Market for Criminal Justice: Federalism, Crime Control, and Jurisdictional 
Competition (2004). 
 
55 See, e.g.,  N.J. STAT . § 2C:7-16 5. c. (prohibiting housing discrimination on the basis of registration as a 
sex offender). 
 
56 Persons, supra  note 9 at 1544-45 (pointing out the specific deterrence problems associated with 
publishing the names of patrons of prostitutes). 
57 See generally Frank Tannenbaum, CRIME AND THE COMMUNITY (1938); W. B. Miller, Lower-Class 
Culture as a Generating Mileu of Gang Delinquency , 14 J. SOCIAL ISSUES 5 (1958) K. T. Erikson, Notes on 
the Sociology of Deviance, 9 SOCIAL PROBLEMS 307 (1962); Howard S. Becker, OUTSIDERS: STUDIES IN 
THE SOCIOLOGY OF DEVIANCE (1963). 
 
58 The initial contribution in this context should be attributed to Steele and Aronson who demonstrated that 
making African Americans vulnerable to a negative stereotype as to their group’s intellectual abilities 
caused them to perform significantly worse then Whites in a standardized test. See Claude M. Steele & 
Joshua Aronson, Stereotype Threat and the Intellectual Test Performance of African Americans, 69 J.  
PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCH. 797 (1995). Ever since this study was reported its results were duplicated in 
numerous studies in different contexts. See, e.g., Claude M. Steele, A Threat in the Air: How Stereotypes 
Shape Intellectual Identity and Performance, 52 AMER. PSYCH. 613 (1997) (reporting on the effects of 
stereotypes with respect to female performance in standardized math tests); Clarck McKnown & Rhona S. 
Weinstein, The Development and Consequences of Stereotype Consciousness in Middle Childhood, 74 
CHILD DEV. 498, 506-10 (2003) (reporting an experiment that demonstrated that once children become 
aware of commonly held stereotypes their cognitive performance is adversely affected); Mara Cadinu et. al, 
Stereotype Threat: The Effect of Expectancy on Performance, 33 EURO. J. SOC. PSYCH. 267 (2003) 
(reporting on the effects of stereotypes with respect to women in math exams and African Americans in 
verbal exams); J. C. Croizet & T. Claire, Extending the Concept of Stereotype Threat to Social Class: The 
Intellectual Underperformance of Students from Low Socioeconomic Backgrounds, 24 PERSONALITY & 
SOC. PSYCH. BULLT . 588 (1998) (showing that low socioeconomic status students under perform on a 
verbal test if it is framed as a test of intelligence); Jacques-Philippe Leyens et. al, Stereotype Threat: Are 
Lower Status and History of Stigmatization Preconditions of Stereotype Threat? , 26 PERSONALITY & SOC. 
PSYCH. BULLT . 1189 (2000) (reporting the effects of stereotypes with respect to males in processing 
affective information); Jeff Stone et al., Stereotype Threat Effects on Black and White Athletic 
Performance, 77 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCH. 1213 (1999) (showing that effects of stereotypes o Whites 
with respect to athletic abilities). For a review of the literature see S. Christian Wheeler & Richard E. Petty, 
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adversely affect performance in situations subject to the stereotype,59 or might decrease 
ones expectations from himself, which in turn might cause actual lower performance. 60  
 
In economic terms the concern over higher future crime rates among stigmatised 
individuals can be tied to the concept of marginal deterrence. The theory of marginal 
deterrence asserts that the law should refrain from inflicting too harsh of a penalty for one 
crime since such sanctions will stand in the way of deterring additional crimes.61 The 
reason for that is that individuals penalized by the harsh sanction will face no effective 
sanction for additional – marginal - crimes since they already face the extremely high 
sanction associated with their first crime. For example, if the punishment for robbery 
were death, then a robber might as well kill the victim since he would lose nothing from 
doing so and would lower his probability of detection by eliminating a witness.62  
 
The potential threat of nonlegal sanctions is inherent to criminal sanctions even 
without the use of shaming sanctions.63 Thus, individuals with low social capital face a 
low potential nonlegal sanction, and are more difficult to deter. Indeed, an abundance of 
studies point out that such individuals tend to have higher crime rates.64 Crimes are 
committed in disproportionately high numbers by unmarried people,65 individuals with 
lower social statues (e.g. low socio-economic status, membership in an oppressed 
minority group),66 and people who have high residential mobility. 67  In addition, 
                                                 
59  Steele, id. at 616-7. This explanation has recently been confirmed by studies that quantified both the 
psychological anxiety and physiological changes that stereotypes cause. See Steven J. Spencer, Claude M. 
Steele & Diane M. Quinn, Stereotype Threat and Women’s Math Performance, 35 J. EXP. SOC. PSYCH. 4, 
14-21 (1999) (reporting findings that demonstrate that anxiety was related to test performance); Jim 
Blascovich et al., African Americans and High Blood Pressure: The Role of Stereotype Threat , 12 PSYCH. 
SCIENCE 225, 228 (2001) (finding that when African Americans were under stereotype threat the exhibited 
higher blood pressure the European Americans while in the absence of stereotype threat the two groups 
exhibited similar blood pressure levels). 
 
60 See Charles Stagnor, Christine Carr & Lisa Kiang, Activating Stereotypes Undermines Task Performance 
Expectations, 75 J. PERS. & SOC. PSYCH. 1191 (1998); Cadinu et al., supra  note 58 at 269-270. But see 
Leyens et. al, supra  note 58 at 1197 (arguing that it is very unlikely that participants preformed less well 
because they felt helpless and unmotivated). 
61  See, e.g., George J Stigler, The Optimum Enforcement of Laws, 78 J. POL. ECON. 526, 527 (1970).  
 
62 Richard Posner, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 222 (6th ed., 2003). 
 
63 See Harold G. Grasmick & Donald E. Green, Legal Punishment, Social Disapproval and Internalization 
as Inhibitors of Illegal Behavior, 71 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 325 (1980) (presenting an empirical 
measurement of the deterrence power of nonlegal sanctions). 
 
64 For an analysis of the effects of creating social capital on the design of criminal sanctions for repeat 
offenders see David A. Dana, Rethinking the Puzzle of Escalating Sanctions for Repeat Offenders, 110 
YALE L. J. 733, 774-5 (2001). 
 
65 See, e.g., N. T. Wolfe, F.T. Cullen & J.B. Cullen, Describing the Female Offender: A Note on the 
Demographics of Arrests, 12 J. Crim. Just. 483 (1984). 
  
66  See John Braithwaite CRIME, SHAME AND REINTEGRATION 48-49 (1989) and studies cited there. 
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historical studies demonstrated that extreme nonlegal sanctions led individuals who were 
subjected to them to a life of criminal activity. For instance, cheek branding, which was 
used in eighteenth century England as a sanction, caused an unconcealable mark on the 
body of criminals that deprived them of any opportunity to reintegrate into society, and 
drove them into a life of habitual crime.68 Thus, a sanctioning regime should avoid 
extremely high nonlegal sanctions, since such sanctions might eliminate the deterrence 
power of nonlegal sanctions with respect to future crimes. Rather, we should strive to 
create a reintegrative shaming regime that is cha racterized by the reacceptance of 
criminals into the community after they were shamed.69  
 
Finally, several commentators have argued that there is something morally wrong 
with state sponsored shaming.70 It would seem, however, that any such argument is 
unconvincing once framed within a discussion of substituting imprisonment with 
nonlegal sanctions. Prison is a degrading experience, and it is difficult to see the moral 
argument that would defend the right of individuals to spend more time incarcerated.71 
Furthermore, this argument becomes even more difficult to defend if the regime adopted 
would allow criminals to choose between the two forms of sanctioning, 72 since under 
such a regime criminals will suffer from the lightest sanction from their perspective.73  
 
The use of nonlegal sanctions might, on the other hand, raise a different moral 
concern. Arguably, nonlegal sanctions have a higher variance than legal sanctions. One 
offender might be subjected to extraordinary harsh nonlegal sanctions, while another 
offender, committing an identical crime, might suffer a mild nonlegal sanction. From an 
economic perspective that focuses on the ex-ante perspective of sanctioning this is of no 
                                                                                                                                                 
67  Studies of the connection between population mobility and crime rates go as far back as the 1930s. See 
E. S. Longmoor & E. F. Young, Ecological Interrelationships of Juvenile Delinquency, Dependency, and 
population Movements: A Cartographic Analysis of Data from long Beach, California, 41 AMER. J. SOC. 
598 (1936). For a more recent study see, e.g., R. D. Crutchfield, M. R. Geerken & W. R. Gove, Crime Rate 
and Social Integration: The Impact of Metropolitan Mobility, 20 CRIMINOLOGY 467 (1982).  
 
68  Posner, supra  note 3 at 105-6. 
 
69 See, Braithwaite, supra  note 66 at 55. One should note that despite his call for reintegration the initial 
premise presented by Braithwaite is that shame has an important role in deterring crime and sustaining a 
free society. Id. at 55. 
70 See, e.g., Massaro, supra  note 6 at 1942-43; Whitman supra  note 6 at 1090-91. 
 
71 See, e.g., Garvey, supra  note 9 at 760 (noting that “evaluating which is more ‘undignified’ – prison or 
public shaming – will depend on the details”); Kahan, supra  note 7 at 646 (arguing that “[h]owever cruel 
shaming is, imprisonment is much worse. It expresses at least as much condemnation, and adds a grotesque 
variety of indignities that shaming cannot hope to rival”). 
 
72 This seems to be the current practice in some cases. See, e.g ., Jay Mathews, Freedom Means Having to 
Say You’re Sorry; Criminal Justice System Tries an 'Apology Ad' Program as an Alternative to Prison, 
WASH. POST , Nov. 9, 1986, at A3 (reporting a case in which the defendant was allowed to choose to 
publish an apology in a local newspaper in lieu of jail time). 
 
73 Kahan, supra note __ at 647 (noting “it is more than paradoxical – it is either confused or disingenuous – 




Published by University of Michigan Law School Scholarship Repository, 2004
SEX, SHAME, AND THE LAW 17 
major consequence, as long as similar offenders face similar sanctions ex-ante. Yet if the 
base for criminal sanctions is ex-post retribution the use of nonlegal sanctions does raise 
a serious problem, since similarly situated criminals might suffer from different 
sanctions. Thus, if nonlegal sanctions do have a higher variance, the argument presented 
in this Article is more committed to the goal of deterrence than I previously 
acknowledged. 
 
In this subsection I presented the economic case for the use of nonlegal sanctions, 
and demonstrated that while the arguments raised against the use of such sanctions do 
point out some valid concerns, they do not represent a reason to forgo the use of these 
sanctions. I now turn to present a model of shaming, which incorporates the effects of the 
law on the shaming behavior of individuals. 
  
3. An Endogenous Model of Shaming 
My analysis, thus far, assumed that a policymaker could simply reduce legal 
sanctions without affecting the level of nonlegal sanctions.74 In this subsection, I will 
relax this assumption and offer an endogenous model for the combined use of legal and 
nonlegal sanctions. More precisely, I will argue that depending on the social context, 
reducing legal sanctions might either lower or raise the level of nonlegal sanctions. Since 
there is limited empirical data on evaluating this issue, I will present a tentative analysis 
of both. 75  
 
The signaling case - One plausible assumption as to the relation between legal and 
nonlegal sanctions is that the demand for inflicting nonlegal sanctions falls as the level of 
legal sanctions diminishes. The causal explanation for this assumption is that legal 
sanctions may serve as a signal that a wrongdoer deserves to be subject to a nonlegal 
sanction. 76 Thus, when courts lower the legal sanctions applied to a certain type of 
offenders, society follows in the same footsteps and lowers the magnitude of nonlegal 
sanctions (for the purposes of this Article I will refer to this effect as “the signaling 
effect”). Some empirical support for the signaling effect can be found in Lott’s study of 
                                                 
74 Studies focusing on the economic analysis of nonlegal sanctions have generally overlooked the potential 
effects of the law on nonlegal sanctions. See, e.g., Kahan & Posner, supra note 7 (not evaluating the effects 
of substituting legal sanctions with nonlegal sanctions); Robert Cooter & Ariel Porat, Should Courts 
Deduct Nonlegal Sanctions from Damages? , 30 J. LEGAL STUD. 401 (2001) (not evaluating the effects of 
deducting nonlegal sanctions from damages). 
 
75 Given the limited data we currently hold on nonlegal sanctions it is not uncommon for scholars to reach 
tentative conclusions in this field. See, e.g., Kahan, supra  note 7 at 607 (noting that “the existing gap in 
empirical knowledge should not discourage informed speculation about how deep-seated public 
sensibilities shape the opportunities for reform”); Massaro, supra  note 6 at 1918 (noting that “[t]hese 
conclusions are subject to an important caveat. No empirical work currently is available with which to test 
the practical impact of shaming sanctions. What follow, therefore, are provisional hypotheses”). 
 
76 See Braithwaite, supra note 66 at 181 (noting that “the levels of punishment the state provides for a 
particular crime themselves give a message about how shameful that offense is”); Kahan, supra  note 7 at 
603 (presenting an endogenous analysis of the law and moral perceptions). 
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nonlegal sanctions in the context of larceny and theft in which he found that longer prison 
sentences are related to lower post conviction income (i.e. a higher nonlegal sanction).77 
 
Two claims can be made as to the efficient use of legal and nonlegal sanctions in 
the signaling case. First, the cost of sanctioning in this case continues to be minimized at 
the point in which the marginal cost of inflicting legal and nonlegal sanctions is equal. 
The intuition underlying this result follows from the intuition of the benchmark case. As 
long as a policymaker is not at a point in which the marginal costs of the legal and 
nonlegal sanctions are equal, she could always lower the cost of sanctioning by shifting 
to the sanctioning technology with the lower marginal cost. Second, in the signaling case 
the efficient combination of legal and nonlegal sanctions will have a higher level of legal 
sanctions when compared to the benchmark case. To understand why, consider again a 
policymaker who is trying to achieve a given total sanction and only uses legal sanctions. 
Just like in the benchmark case, she begins to gradually substitute legal with nonlegal 
sanctions. Yet notice that in the signaling case each substitution has two effects. First, as 
in the benchmark case, each substitution increases the amount of nonlegal sanctions used, 
and shifts the policymaker to nonlegal sanctions with higher marginal costs. Second, each 
substitution lowers the level of the legal sanction, which in the signaling case raises the 
cost of nonlegal sanctions. In other words, in the signaling case each substitution will 
cause a greater rise in the marginal cost of nonlegal sanctions. Thus, the policymaker will 
reach the point in which the marginal costs of legal and nonlegal sanctions are equal after 
substituting a lower amount of legal sanctions.  
 
Again, a simple numerical example might be useful. The signaling effect can be 
captured as a rise in the cost of inflicting nonlegal sanctions when the legal sanction is 







500 100 500 98 198 
600 110 400 77 187 
700 124 300 60 184 
Table 2: The Signaling Case 
 
As is evident from table 2, the efficient combination of legal and nonlegal sanctions in 
this case is 700 and 300 respectfully, the combination in which the marginal cost of the 
two is equal. Furthermore, table 2 demonstrates that the rise in the cost of nonlegal 
                                                 
77 See John R. Lott, Jr., Do We Punish High Income Criminals too Heavily? , 30 ECON. INQUIRY 583, 597 
(1992). It should be noted that part of the decline in the income of individuals that serve prison sentences 
could be explained by the fact that they lose part of their human capital during their stay in prison – a factor 
that is irrelevant in the case of damages. Nevertheless, the data presented by Lott demonstrates that the 
decline in the income of convicted individuals exceeds any potential loss due to the loss of human capital. 
But see Nigel Walker & Catherine Marsh, Do Sentences Affect Public Disapproval?, 24 BRIT . J. 
CRIMINOLOGY 27 (1984) (presenting data suggesting that in general sentencing has a limited effect on the 
disapproval of a wrongful act). 
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sanctions created by the signaling effect shifted the cost minimizing combination to one 
in which a higher amount of legal sanctions should be utilized. 
 
The substitution case – A second plausible assumption regarding the effect of the level of 
legal sanctions on the level of nonlegal sanctions is that the demand for inflicting 
nonlegal sanctions rises as the legal sanction diminishes. According to this assumption 
individuals wish to see that offenders suffer from an “appropriate” sanction. 78 Put 
differently, offenders have a debt that they need to repay to society, and this debt can be 
discharged of by legal or nonlegal means.79 Since legal sanctions and nonlegal sanctions 
produce the same outcome – the infliction of harm to wrongdoers – these two may serve 
as substitutes (for the purposes of this Article I will refer to this effect as “the substitution 
effect”).80 Empirical support for the substitution effect can be found in the crowding out 
literature. For many years this literature has pointed out that organized regulatory and 
market institutions might crowd out public motivation to create alternative social 
mechanisms.81 Recently, this literature has expanded to the field of sanctioning, and 
                                                 
78 It should be noted that this effect could bring about not only nonlegal sanctions, but also nonlegal 
“remedies” to individuals who have been subjected to what their community perceives to be an excessive 
legal sanctions. For example, Braithwaite reports that among doctors who were found liable in medical 
malpractice suits ninety per cent had a negative effects on their practice and eight per cent reported an 
improvement in business after the suit. This later figure is explained by the fact that fellow doctors who felt 
sorry for the doctors sanctioned by the legal system wished to assist them. See Braithwaite, supra  note 66 at 
128 (citing a study conducted by Cressey).  
 
79 In the context of the nonlegal sanctions being inflicted to sex offenders one can find arguments that 
offenders have “paid their debt to society” and should not be subjected to further social sanctions. See, e.g ., 
Logan, supra note 44 at 1292-3 (referring to comments made by Senator Thomas Neuville of Minnesota); 
Elizabeth Garfinkle, Coming of Age in America: The Misapplication of Sex-Offender Registration and 
Community Notification Laws to Juveniles, 21 CAL. L.  REV. 163, 175 (2003) (quoting comments made by 
North Carolina Representative Watt); Amy L. Van Duyn, The Scarlet Letter Branding, A Constitutional 
Analysis of Community Notification Provisions in Sex Offender Statutes, 47 DRAKE L. REV. 635, 659 
(1999) (noting that “once offenders are released, they have paid their debt to society and have the 
constitutional right to re-integrate into society”). 
 
80 There is a long line of literature that demonstrates that the law has evolved as a substitute for nonlegal 
sanctions, specifically for revenge based nonlegal sanctions. Perhaps the most famous such claim can be 
found in Oliver W. Holmes, Jr., THE COMMON LAW, 1-38 (1881). In his first lecture on the law Holmes 
argues that various forms of legal liability developed from the concept of revenge. For a more 
contemporary analysis of this argument see Richard A. Posner, LAW AND LITERATURE, 49-60 (2nd ed., 
1998) (analysing the evolution from revenge to law). For a model of the development from a revenge based 
society to a legalistic society see, e.g., Geoffrey MacCormack, Revenge and Compensation in Early Law, 
21 AMER. J. COMP . L. 69, 74 (1973). 
 
81 See, e.g.,  A. Ostman, External Control may Destroy the Commons, 10 RATIONALITY & SOC’Y 103 (1998) 
(suggesting that external regulation of common pool resources could diminish the moral obligations of 
individuals and undermine internal regulation); R. M. Titmus, THE GIFT OF RELATIONSHIP : FROM HUMAN 
BLOOD TO SOCIAL POLICY (1971) (arguing that monetary payments to givers of blood could diminish the 
amount of blood given voluntarily). Additional support for this effect can be found in Lott's study of 
nonlegal sanctions that are applied to individuals convicted in drug related offenses. See John R. Lott, Jr., 
An Attempt at Measuring the Total Monetary Penalty from Drug Convictions: The Importance of an 
Individual’s Reputation, 21 J. LEGAL STUD. 159, 176 (1992).  In this study Lott found that individuals with 
longer prison sentences had higher post conviction income (i.e. a lower nonlegal sanctions), though these 
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preliminary studies have demonstrated that the use of legal sanctions might crowd out 
nonlegal sanctions.82 For example, a study conducted in day-care centers in Israel found 
that the introduction of a fine that was levied on parents who were late to pick up their 
children caused a rise in the number of parents coming in late.83 This data can be 
interpreted as an indication that when legal sanctions, such as a fine, move in, nonlegal 
sanctions, such as guilt and shame, are crowded out. Thus, parents who avoided being 
late since they were unwilling to endure the nonlegal sanctions associated with being late, 
were willing to endure the legal sanction that substituted the nonlegal sanction. 84  
 
Two claims can be made as to the efficient use of legal and nonlegal sanctions in 
the substitution case. First, as should be clear by this point, the cost of sanctioning in this 
case is minimized at the point in which the marginal cost of inflicting legal and nonlegal 
sanctions are equal. Second, in the substitution case the efficient combination of legal and 
nonlegal sanctions will have a lower level of legal sanctions, when compared to the 
benchmark case. To understand why, consider once again our policymaker. In the 
substitution case each reduction in legal sanctions will have two effects. First, just like in 
the benchmark case, it increases the amount of nonlegal sanctions being used, and 
therefore shifts the policymaker to nonlegal sanctions with higher marginal costs. 
Second, each reduction lowers the cost of nonlegal sanctions by raising the motivation of 
individuals to inflict nonlegal sanctions. In other words, in the substitution case each 
move to nonlegal sanctions will cause a smaller rise in the marginal cost of nonlegal 
sanctions. Hence, the policymaker will reach the point in which the marginal costs of 
legal and nonlegal sanctions are equal after substituting more legal sanctions. 
 
Continuing to follow the numerical example presented above, the substitution 
effect can be captured as a fall in the cost of inflicting nonlegal sanctions when the legal 







                                                                                                                                                 
results were not statistically significant. See also Walker & Marsh, supra note 77 at 40 (pointing out that 
“in certain circumstances a severe sentence might even lower disapproval”). 
 
82 See Uri Gneezy & Aldo Rustichini, A Fine Is a Price, 29 J. LEGAL STUD. 1 (2000); Juan Camilo 
Cardenas & John Stranlund, Local Environmental Control and Institutional Crowding-Out, 28 WORLD 
DEVELOPMENT  1719 (2000) (pointing out that the introduction of a regulatory environmental scheme 
backed by legal sanctions could diminish the tendency of individuals to act according to group interests ). 
 
83 Gneezy & Rustichini, id. at 5-8. 
 
84 Although Gneezy and Rustichini do not state their explanation for their results in the terms used above, 
they in effect employ a similar explanation. Gneezy and Rustichini hypothesis that the introduction of a 
fine changes the nature of the transaction since while there exists a norm of not making use of the services 
of the day care center for free, once a price is set for these services (in the form of a fine) being late no 
longer violates the norm. Id. at 13-4. In their analysis Gneezy and Rustichini offer an additional explanation 
for the behavior they documented that relies on a model in which parents hold imperfect information as to 
the type of person the manager of the day-care center is (i.e. what kind of sanctions will she inflict to them 
if they are late to pick up their child). In this model the use of a fine indicates the type of person the day-
care center owner is and therefore causes individuals to increase the number of late arrivals. Id. at 10-13.  
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500 100 500 71 171 
600 110 400 63 173 
700 124 300 56 180 
Table 3: The Substitution Case 
 
As is evident from table 3, the efficient combination of legal and nonlegal sanctions in 
this case is 500 and 500, the combination in which the marginal cost of the two is equal. 
Furthermore, table 3 demonstrates that the fall in the cost of nonlegal sanctions created 
by the substitution effect shifted the cost minimizing combination to one in which a lower 
amount of legal sanctions is being utilized. 
 
4. Endogenous Legal Sanctions  
In this subsection I turn to evaluate the way nonlegal sanctions might affect legal 
sanctions. More precisely, it will be argued that judges, jurors, and prosecutors might 
adjust legal sanctions, if legislatures choose to enla rge the total sanction by using 
nonlegal sanctions. Furthermore, it will be shown that high mandatory nonlegal sanctions 
might lead to the counter intuitive result of lowering the aggregate sanction offenders 
face.  
 
Some of the players in the criminal jus tice system, such as judges and 
prosecutors, have a perception of what an appropriate sanction is, and in many cases they 
hold substantial discretion over the sanctioning process. Thus, if legislatures add nonlegal 
sanctions at a level that judges or prosecutors perceive to be unfair, they might 
circumvent this by adjusting the legal sanction using their discretion, or by choosing not 
to use the nonlegal sanctions added by the legislature. If, however, the supplemental 
nonlegal sanction is large, in the sense that even on its own it is viewed as excessive, and 
its application is mandatory, then the only option judges and prosecutors who wish to 
avoid applying an excessive sanction have is not to convict the offender with an offence 
that triggers the nonlegal sanction.85 For example, a prosecutor reluctant to subject a 
defendant to a severe mandatory shaming sanction that is attached to a certain crime, 
might agree to plea him to a charge that does not trigger the shaming sanction. 86 This 
type of behavior has in fact been documented in the contexts of The Federal Sentencing 
Guidelines and federal supplemental sanctions (such as the ban on holding firearms that 
is attached to convictions of domestic abuse).87  
                                                 
85 Neal Kumar Katyal, Deterrence's Difficulty, 95 MICH. L. REV. 2385, 2451 (1997). 
 
86 Id. Another example could be jurors who are reluctant to vote to convict. Id. 
 
87 See Stephen J. Schulhofer & Ilene H. Nagel, Plea Negotiations Under the Federal Sentencing 
Guidelines: Guideline Circumvention and its Dynamics in the Post-Mistretta Period, 91 NW. L. REV. 1284 
(1997) (discussing the circumvention of the Federal Sentencing Guidelines); Robert A. Mikos, State 
Crimes Carrying Federal Penalties: The Law and Economics of Federal Supplemental Sanctions, 
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Adding high mandatory nonlegal sanctions to legal sanc tions might also affect the 
plea bargaining process by raising the incentives of defendants to go to trial. 88 If 
sanctions are mandatory, the only benefit of a plea agreement for defendants is the saving 
in trial costs, which given a sufficiently high sanction will not justify forgoing the 
opportunity of acquittal at trial. Eliminating the ability to reach plea agreements 
regarding offenses with mandatory nonlegal sanction is expected to cause prosecutors, 
who operate within budgetary constraints and want to encourage plea agreements, to 
circumvent this sanction by reducing the charges to charges that do not trigger it.   
 
To understand the argument better, one might wish to view the following 
numerical example.89 Assume that a prosecutor may charge a defendant with either 
assault or sexual assault. The maximal sanction for assault is 500 and the maximal 
sanction for sexual assault is 1,000. Both parties have equal probabilities to win at trial 
with respect to both charges. Assuming that the prosecutor wishes to maximize the 
sanction imposed on the defendant she will charge him with sexual assault. At this point 
the defendant will agree to plea to sexual assault as long as the prosecutor offers him a 
sanction that is lower than his expected sanction (0.5*1,000 = 500). Now assume a world 
in which a mandatory nonlegal sanction of 1,100 is applied to those convicted of sexual 
assault, but not to those convicted of assault. The introduction of this sanction eliminated 
the incentive of the defendant to agree to plea to sexual assault, since the lowest sanction 
the prosecutor can offer him (the mandatory 1,100), is larger than the expected sanction 
at trial (0.5*(1,000 + 1,100) = 1,050). Thus, the only basis for a plea agreement in this 
case can be an assault charge, which will allow the prosecutor to offer the defendant a 
sanction that is slightly bellow his expected sanction at trial (0.5*500 = 250). The 




Nonlegal sanctions not added Nonlegal sanctions added  
Expected 
Sanction 
Plea Range Expected 
Sanction 
Plea Range 
Charge: Sexual Assault 500 <500 1,050 1,100< 
Charge: Assault 250 <250 250 <250 
Table 4: Sanctions with and without mandatory supplemental nonlegal sanctions 
 
Furthermore, encouraging defendants to litigate rather than accept plea 
agreements might lower the total sanction that is imposed on offenders.90 The reason for 
                                                 
88  Mikos, id. (analysing this point in the context of federal supplemental sanctions). This is a general point 
that holds with respect to mandatory sanctions. See Stephen J. Schulhofer, Rethinking Mandatory 
Minimums, 28 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 199, 209 (1993).  
 
89 The example in the text draws from Mikos, id. 
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this is that once defendants can credibly threat to go to trial, prosecutors will either have 
to agree to plea bargain to lesser charges that do not trigger the supplemental sanction 
and have a lower legal sanction, or trial a small number of offenders and generate a few 
large sanctions. Returning to the numerical example above, assume that the prosecutor 
has a fixed budget of $20, trials cost prosecutors $10, plea agreements cost prosecutors 
$1, there are 30 potential defendants to prosecute for sexual assault, and prosecutors and 
defendants have equal bargaining power in the plea negotiation (i.e., they agree on a 
sanction that is ha lf of the expected sanction). In a world with no supplemental nonlegal 
sanctions, the prosecutor will be able to reach plea agreements with 20 defendants on 
sexual assault charges, for a total sanction of 5,000. On the other hand, in a world with 
supplemental nonlegal sanctions, pleading defendants to sexual assault is no longer an 
option, thus, the prosecutor has three other options: plea 20 defendants to assault, for a 
total sanction of 2,500; plea 10 defendants to assault and take one to trial on a sexua l 
assault charge, for a total expected sanction of 2,300; or take two defendants to trial on a 
sexual assault charge for a total expected sanction of 2,100.  
 
This subsection has demonstrated that the actual legal sanction offenders face 
might be adjusted once nonlegal sanctions are introduced. This is of importance since at 
times legislatures might simply add nonlegal sanctions to existing legal sanctions, and 
assume they succeeded to create higher sanction. 91 It would seem that nonlegal sanctions 
are susceptible to this type of behavior since legislatures might only account for the cost 
of inducing nonlegal sanctions, while ignoring the other social costs of sanctioning.92  
 
* * * 
To sum up, in this Section I have argued that using nonlegal sanctions as a 
substitute for costly legal sanctions could lower the aggregate cost of sanctioning. 
Nevertheless, determining the efficiency of such a sanctioning regime depends on the 
magnitude of the problems associated with the use of nonlegal sanctions that were 
mapped out. Furthermore, designing a regime that will utilize nonlegal sanctions in an 
optimal fashion requires taking into account the potential effects of legal sanctions on 
nonlegal sanctions, and the potential effects of nonlegal sanctions on legal sanctions. 
These general insights will be employed when I turn now to analyse the way in which sex 
offenders are being sanctioned. 
 
III. A PUNITIVE APPROACH TOWARDS SORNLS 
  
In this Section I will begin to evaluate a concrete example of using legally 
induced nonlegal sanctions as punishment. Namely, I will present a case study of the 
current practice of publicizing the names of sex offenders. I will begin my analysis by 
reviewing the current content of SORNLs. I will then turn to point out that SORNLs have 
questionable value as a crime prevention tool. Rather, I will argue that SORNLs should 
                                                 
91 Kahan, supra  note 7 at 605 (noting that the use of alternative sanctions has caused sanctions to become 
more severe since they were simply added to preexisting sanctions). 
 
92 See supra  note 38.  
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be viewed as a sanction generating tool. Finally, I will evaluate the potential effects of 
SORNLs on the future criminal behavior of offenders who are subjected to them and on 
the legal sanctions that are applied to sex offenders.  
 
1. Legal Background: Sex Offender Registration and Notification Laws 
SORNLs, commonly known as Megan’s Laws, reflect a significant change in the 
landscape of American criminal law. 93 In general, these laws require convicted sex 
offenders, who are released into the community, to register as sex offenders, and provide 
for some level of public notification as to the presence of a sex offender in the 
community. Currently, all fifty states and the District of Columbia have enacted their 
own version of a SORNL. 94 
 
Undoubtedly, the single event that triggered the overwhelming wave of 
registration and notification legislation of the late 90s was the brutal murder of Megan 
Kanka, a seven-year-old girl, on July 29, 1994.95 Megan was raped and murdered by a 
neighbor of the Kanka family, who lived across the street and was a convicted sex 
offender.96 Following the murder, Megan’s parents began a public campaign for the 
adoption of sex offender registration and notification laws. Just two weeks after the 
murder, bills providing for sex offender registration and notification were introduced to 
the New Jersey General Assembly, 97 and by the end of October of that year, after an 
abbreviated legislative process, the state’s SORNL was enacted.98 At the same time, other 
states started to follow in the footsteps of New Jersey, and enacted similar laws.99  
 
Politicians in Congress, who were aware of the growing national concern over sex 
offenders, moved to introduce federal legislation on the matter. The Jacob Wetterling 
                                                 
93 In fact, these laws are not limited to the United States and have already crossed the Atlantic to England. 
See Meghann J. Dugan, Megan’s Law or Sarah’s Law? A Comparative Analysis of Public Notification 
Statutes in the United States and England, 23 LOY. L.A. INT’L & COMP L. REV. 617 (2001) (comparing 
American SORNLs with the English equivalent). 
 
94 Smith, 538 U.S. at 90. 
 
95 E.B. v. Verniero, 119 F.3d 1077, 1081 (3d Cir. 1997). Though this murder triggered the nation wide 
adoption of SORNLs such laws did exist previously. A prominent example of a state that had such a law 
since the 1940s is California. See CAL. PENAL CODE § 290 (West 1947). The first state to introduce the 
concept of public notification was Washington, which in 1990 enacted its Community Protection Act. See 
WASH. REV. CODE ANN. §§ 4.24.550, 9A.44130 (West 1995 & Supp. 1997). As of 1983 five states enacted 
some form of sex offender registration law. See In re Reed, 33 Cal.3d 914, 925 (Cal. 1983). Nevertheless, 
until the case of Megan Kanka there was no sign that other states were about to adopt similar regimes. 




98 Id. at 1081-2. 
 
99 According to one account in 1994 prior to the enactment of any federal legislation on the matter twenty-
five states had some form of a SORNL and sixteen other states were considering similar pieces of 
legislation. See Houston, supra  note 36 at 731. 
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Crimes Against Children and Sexually Violent Offender Registration Act,100 enacted in 
1994, required all states to enact sex offender registration laws. The Jacob Wetterling Act 
gave states a strong incentive to comply by conditioning federal law enforcement 
grants.101 Federal lawmakers decided to go a step further in 1996, and required states to 
add notification provisions to their laws.102 Following this amendment, the guidelines 
issued by the attorney general explicitly stated tha t information must be disseminated to 
the general public when needed.103  
  
A full comparative analysis of SORNLs is beyond the scope of this Article. 
Nevertheless, some characterization of these laws is necessary in order to further the 
discussion. With respect to the registration aspects of SORNLs, the minimal requirements 
states must live up to are set out in the Jacob Wetterling Act. Every state is required to 
have a sex offender registry, which must include the names, addresses, fingerprints, and 
photographs of all sex offenders.104 Registration is generally triggered by a conviction of 
one of the offenses enumerated in the statute.105 These offenses, in most cases, include all 
sex crimes not withstanding the identity of the victim, and several specific crimes, such 
as kidnapping, that require registration only if the victim of the crime was a minor.106 
Notice that despite the fact that SORNLs are perceived and marketed as laws aimed 
                                                 
100 42 U.S.C. § 14071 [hereinafter: the Jacob Wetterling Act]. 
 
101 42 U.S.C. § 14071(g). 
 
102 42 U.S.C. § 14071(e)(2) (stating that “the State shall release the relevant information that is necessary to 
protect the public concerning a specific person required to register under this section”). Until 1996 federal 
law did not require states to engage in notification, and it simply indicated that states “may release” 
information in a way that they found would protect the public safety (42 U.S.C. § 14071(d) (1994)). 
 
103 The attorney general guidelines provide that: 
…a state cannot comply with the Act by releasing registration information only to law 
enforcement agencies, to other governmental or non-governmental agencies or 
organizations, to prospective employers, or to the victims of the registrants’ offenses. 
States cannot comply by having purely permissive or discretionary authority for 
officials to release registration information. Information must be released to members 
of the public as necessary to protect the public from registered offenders. 
Megan’s Law; Final Guidelines for the Jacob Wetterling Crimes Against Children and Sexually Violent 
Offender Registration Act, as Amended, 64 FED. REG. 572, 581 (1999) [hereinafter: The Final Guidelines]. 
 
104 42 U.S.C. § 14071 (b). In addition the Jacob Wetterling Act requires states to collect information as to 
identifying factors, anticipated future residence, offense history, and documentation of any treatment 
received for mental abnormalities or personality disorders with respect to individuals that are deemed to be 
sexually violent predators.  
 
105 42 U.S.C. § 14071 (a)(1)(A) (basing registration requirements on past convictions). But see infra 
Section IV 5 (discussing registration which is based on charges rather than on convictions). 
 
106 42 U.S.C. §§ 14071 (a)(1)(A), (a)(3)(A) (registration required of persons convicted of a sexually violent 
offense or of a criminal offense against a minor, which includes several sexually oriented crimes, 
kidnapping and false imprisonment).  
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towards preventing child oriented sex crimes,107 these laws have an extremely large scope 
that covers all sex offenders.  
 
Initial registration is conducted upon the conviction of the offender, his release 
from incarceration, or his moving into a new state.108 Following this registration, 
offenders are required to update any change in their personal information, and verify their 
information on an annual or quarterly basis.109 As for the duration of registration, the 
minimal period required by the Jacob Wetterling Act is ten years from the date of release 
from prison, 110 yet any offender that has been convicted more than once of an enumerated 
offense, has been convicted of an aggravated offense, or has been found to be a sexually 
violent predator, must register for life.111  
 
Turning to the issue of notification, the Jacob Wetterling Act requires some level 
of public notification, however it leaves room for diversity as to the details. In fact, states 
do diverge dramatically on this matter. The predominant way of notification is by the 
Internet. Currently 39 states and the District of Columbia operate websites that allow 
visitors to obtain information about registered sex offenders.112 While all websites 
include general details such as name, date of birth, physical characteristics, and the 
offense committed,113 others include additional information, such as a photo of the 
offender and a description of the mode of operation of the offender given in plain 
                                                 
107 Filler, supra note 44 at 355-8 (noting that in most legislative debates surrounding these laws legislatures 
seem to represent these laws as laws that target sex offenders who victimise children).  
In his remarks at the signing ceremony of Megan’s Law on May 17th, 1996 president William Jefferson 
Clinton made the following remarks: 
 
From now on, every State in the country will be required by law to tell a community when 
a dangerous sexual predator enters its midst. We respect people’s rights, but today America 
proclaims there is no greater right than a parent’s right to raise a child in safety and love. 
Today America warns: If you dare prey on our children, the law will follow you wherever 
you go. State to state, town to town. 
Today, America circles the wagon around our children. 
Available in LEXIS, Codes Library, Presdc File. 
 
108 42 U.S.C. § 14071(b). 
 
109 42 U.S.C. §§ 14071 (b)(1)(A)(ii); (b)(3). 
 
110 42 U.S.C. § 14071 (b)(6)(A). 
 
111 42 U.S.C. § 14071 (b)(6)(B). 
 
112 As of 2002 34 States and the District of Columbia had such websites. See Brief for the United States as 
Amicus Curiae in Support of Petitioners at 1(a)-24(a), Smith v. Doe, 538 U.S. 84 (U.S. 2003) (No. 01-729). 
Ever since five additional states have begun to operate such websites: Iowa (see 
http://www.iowasexoffenders.com/); Maine (see http://www4.informe.org/sor/); New Hampshire (see  
http://www.state.nh.us/safety/nhsp/); Ohio (see http://www.drc.state.oh.us/search2.htm); and Oklahoma 
(see http://docapp8.doc.state.ok.us/servlet/page?_pageid=190&_dad=portal30&_schema=PORTAL30), (all 
last visited January 8, 2004).  
 
113 The Michigan website offers an example of a rather minimalist one. See http://www.mipsor.state.mi.us/ 
(last visited January 8, 2004). 
27
Teichman:
Published by University of Michigan Law School Scholarship Repository, 2004
SEX, SHAME, AND THE LAW 27 
terms.114  This information can be obtained with respect to specific individuals and with 
respect to specific geographical areas.115   
 
Aside from the Internet, states employ an array of notification tools. In California 
notification is conducted on the basis of calling a 900 number and CD-ROMs that are 
available at local police stations.116 Other states require police officers to conduct 
notification. 117 Perhaps the most intrusive of all are the Louisiana notification provisions. 
Under the Louisiana SORNL an offender is required to give notice of the crime he has 
committed, his name, and address to at least one person in every residence or business 
within a one-mile radius in a rural area and a three square block area in an urban area.118 
In addition, the offender is required to publish at his expense an ad in the official journal 
or a newspaper, which will include the details of his crime, his name, address, and 
photo.119 Louisiana courts may issue additional notification requirements, such as signs, 
handbills, bumper stickers, or labeled clothing.120  
 
Finally, one should note that states differ as to whether an individual risk 
assessment aimed towards determining the risk that a specific sex offender might re-
offend should be conducted prior to notification. Some states, such as New Jersey, 
Massachusetts and New York, chose to conduct such assessments.121 In Massachusetts, 
this program includes a special board that evaluates the offender and categorizes him into 
one of three risk groups. Based on this risk assessment different levels of notification are 
conducted.122 At the same time, other states, such as Alaska, Connecticut and Oklahoma, 
                                                 
 
114 The New Jersey website offers such information. See http://www.njsp.org/info/reg_sexoffend.html (last 
visited January 8, 2004). 
 
115 See, e.g., the Michigan website, supra  note 113. 
 
116 CAL. PENAL CODE §§ 290.4(3), (4). 
 
117 For example, the Alabama SORNL provides that the chief of police or the sheriff will notify the 
presence of a sex offender to all persons living within 1,000ft. (in cities), 1,500ft. (in towns), and 2,00ft. (in 
rural areas) of the residence of the sex offender. See ALA. CODE § 15-20-25(a). 
 
118 LA. REV. STAT . § 542B(1)(a). Subsection (b) continues and requires the offender to notify the 
superintendent of the school district in which he resides, and subsection (c) requires him to notify the 
lessor, landlord, or owner of the property in which he resides. 
 
119 LA . REV. STAT . § 542B(2)(a). 
 
120 LA . REV. STAT . § 542B(3). 
 
121 See N.J. STAT § 2C:7-8 (instructing the Attorney General to issue guidelines that will enable individual 
risk assessment); MASS. STAT . § 178K (establishing a board responsible for risk assessment); N.Y.  CODE § 
168-l (same). 
 
122 MASS. STAT . § 178K(2). More specifically, in case of level one (low risk) offenders the law requires 
notification of law enforcement agencies and prohibits public notification (MASS. STAT . § 178K(2)(a)). 
With respect to level two (moderate risk) offenders the law requires that the information be disseminated to 
law enforcement agencies and that this information be accessible to the public (MASS. STAT . § 178K(2)(b)). 
Finally, with respect to level three (high-risk) offenders the law requires that the police shall actively 
disseminate the information regarding these offenders to the public (MASS. STAT . § 178K(2)(c)). 
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do not conduct individualized risk assessments, and use past convictions as the sole 
criteria for notification. 123  
 
2. The Preventative Approach Towards SORNLs 
The main political force driving the enactment of SORNLs was the fear from 
released sex offenders, and the assumption that they will assist in preventing future sex 
crimes.124 The logic of adopting these laws was that sex offenders have exceptionally 
high recidivism rates, and that once members of communities know of the presence of a 
sex offender they will be able to protect themselves. This line of thought is problematic 
for two reasons. First, the assumption of high recidivism rates, as a general phenomenon 
among all sex offenders, is questionable. Second, even if this assumption is valid, 
SORNLs supply a poor tool for communities to protect themselves.  
 
Legislatures enacting SORNLs often refer to “exceptionally high” recidivism 
rates of sex offenders as a reason for their adoption. 125 This has also been an underlying 
assumption in much of the scholarly work on SORNLs,126 and reflects the attitude of the 
general public.127 Yet a close examination of the studies conducted with respect to sex 
offenders’ recidivism rates reveals a picture that is more complicated then these 
unquestioned assumptions. Several reviews of the empirical literature have pointed out 
that interpreting the recidivism data is a complicated task, and that at least according to 
                                                                                                                                                 
 
123 OKLA. STAT. §§ 581-589; CONN. STAT. §§ 54-250 –54-261; ALASKA STAT. §§ 12.63.010 - 12.63.100. 
 
124 See, e.g., Filler, supra note 44 at 329-46; Daniel L. Feldman, The “Scarlet Letter Laws” of the 1990s: A 
Response to Critics, 60 ALB. L. REV. 1081 , 1101-1109 (1997). 
 
125 See Filler, id. at 335-8 (reviewing statistical claims made by legislatures at the time of the enactment of 
SORNLs). Several legislatures have mentioned high recidivism rates as part of the legislative findings 
underlying the legislation. See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 15-20-20.1 (“The Legislature finds that the danger of 
recidivism posed by criminal sex offenders and that the protection of the public from these offenders is a 
paramount concern or interest to government”); ARK. CODE § 12-12-902 (“The General Assembly finds 
that sex offenders pose a high risk of re-offending after release from custody”); IDAHO CODE § 18-8302 
(“The legislature finds that sexual offenders present a significant risk of reoffense”); NEB. STAT . § 29-4002 
(“The Legis lature finds that sex offenders present a high risk to commit repeat offenses”). 
 
126 See, e.g ., David S. DeMatto, Welcome to Anytown U.S.A. – Home of Beautiful Scenery (and Convicted 
Sex Offender): Sex Offender Registration and Notification Laws in E.B. v. Verniero , 43 VILL. L.  REV. 581, 
581, (1998) (stating “[o]ne of the most vexing aspects of sexual predation is the high recidivism rate, 
especially among sex offenders who target and victimize children”); Houston, supra  note 36 at 731 (noting 
that “sex offenders have the highest rates of recidivism of any group of criminals”). 
 
127 See, e.g., Leonore M. J. Simon, An Examination of the Assumptions of Specialization, Mental Disorder, 
and Dangerousness in Sex Offenders, 18 BEHAV. SCI. & L. 275, 300 (2000) (noting that “[t]he public shares 
the sentiment of the legislature and fears the repeat sex offender who is incapable of rehabilitation”); 
Bedarf, supra  note 53 at 898 (citing a Canadian study indicating public perceptions of high recidivism rates 
among sex offenders as a group). Similar attitudes rise out of advocacy groups promoting SORNLs. As the 
website of Klasskids, a foundation dedicated to stopping crimes against children, put it “[s]ex offenders 
pose a high risk of re -offending after release from custody”. See http://www.klaaskids.org/pg-legmeg.htm 
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some studies sex offenders actually have lower recidivism rates than other groups of 
offenders.128  Recently, a Bureau of Justice Statistics study showed that sex offenders 
generally have a lower rate of re-arrest than other violent offenders, but they do have a 
substantially higher chance to be re-arrested for a new violent sex offense.129 These 
studies raise the question, why should we develop comprehensive registration and 
notification regimes towards sex offenders when we do not create such a regime for 
murderers, thieves, and drug dealers?130  
 
Nevertheless, pointing out that we might want to adopt similar laws that will 
apply to other types of criminals, does not demonstrate that we should not adopt such a 
scheme with respect to sex offenders. A more serious problem of SORNLs is that even if 
sex offenders do represent a more significant risk when compared to other offenders, 
SORNLs are simply a problematic crime prevention tool. In the few studies conducted to 
evaluate the effectiveness of SORNLs researchers could find no statistically significant 
difference in recidivism rates between offenders who were subjected to notification and 
those who were not.131 A study evaluating the prevention potential of the Massachusetts 
SORNL,132 which knowingly made unrealistically optimistic assumptions,133 found that 
out of 136 serious sex offenders that were incarcerated only 6 had a good or poor to 
moderate probability of being notified to their victims (or guardian) before hand.134 Thus, 
this study provides an indication of the limited preventative value of SORNLs.135  
                                                 
128 See, e.g ., Bedarf, id. at 893-98 (reviewing data regarding recidivism rates and concluding that recidivism 
“is not as a significant of a problem as [some] claim”); Small, supra  note 8 at 1456-8 (reviewing and 
analyzing sex offenders’ recidivism rates); Simon, supra  note 127 at 301 (noting that “[w]hat is clear is that 
there is no emp irical evidence that predictions of future sex offenses based on convictions for past ones are 
accurate”). See also  Lisa C. Trivits & N. Dickon Reppucci, Application of Megan’s Law to Juveniles, 57 
AM. PSYCHOLOGIST  690, 698-700 (2002) (reviewing the literature regarding sex offender recidivism rates 
and emphasizing that juvenile sex offenders have significantly lower recidivism rates). 
 
129 Lawrence A. Greenfeld, Sixty Percent of Convicted Sex Offenders Are on Parole or Probation , Bureau 
of Justice Statistics News Release, Feb. 2, 1997, available at 1997 WL 53093 (D.O.J.). 
 
130 Registration statutes that applied to more general categories of criminals date back to the 1930s. See 
Note, Criminal Registration Ordinances: Police Control Over Potential Recidivists, 103 U. PA. L. REV. 60, 
61-4 (1954); Note, Criminal Registration Law, 27 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 295 (1936-1937). 
 
131 See Logan, supra  note 44 at 1337 (citing two unpublished studies). See also  Simon, supra  note 127 at 
300 (noting that “there is no empirical evidence that sexual offender registration laws achieve their 
intended aims”); Trivits & Reppucci, supra note 128 at 695 (noting that “there is currently no evidence that 
the registration and notification statutes have protected children in the community). 
 
132 Anthony J. Petrosino & Carolyn Petrosino, The Public Safety Potential of Megan’s Law in 
Massachusetts: An Assessment From a Sample of Criminal Sexual Psychopaths, 45 CRIME & 
DELINQUENCY 140, (1999). 
 
133 Petrosino and Petrosino chose for their study only sex offenders who were actually incarcerated. In 
addition, they assumed perfect compliance with the law, perfect notification by the police, and error-free 
risk assessment of offenders. Finally, their study focused on sexual psychopaths, rather than felony sex 
offenders, again most likely overstating the power of the Massachusetts SORNL. See Id. at 145-7.  
 
134 Id. at 150. 
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Evaluating the way in which SORNLs work demonstrates the difficulties they 
have in preventing crimes. First, SORNLs depend on sex offenders for information. 
Given the limited resources that are devoted to verifying registration, and the lack of a 
central identification system in the United States, it is quite simple for offenders to slip 
through the cracks of the registration system by not registering. A recent survey 
conducted by Parents for Megan’s Law, a non-profit advocacy organization, found that 
on average states are unable to account for 24 percent of the sex offenders that are 
suppose to be listed.136 In the state of California alone 33,000 offenders are unaccounted 
for.137 Furthermore, it would seem reasonable to assume that sex offenders that are 
engaged in re-offending are disproportionately represented within this group, since other 
things equal, they have a higher motivation to avoid registration. Thus, states are actually 
putting efforts into compiling information on those sex offenders who pose a lower risk.  
 
Second, public notification might exacerbate the problem of registration 
avoidance since the nonlegal sanctions that are triggered by it give offenders a strong 
incentive not to register.138 In other words, offenders that would willfully register if their 
information would only be used for investigative purposes, refuse to register once they 
realize tha t the information will be widely disseminated. Thus, public notification might 
reduce the amount of information law enforcement agencies hold with respect to sex 
offenders. 
 
Finally, SORNLs do nothing to prevent offenders from traveling to a close by 
neighborhood, where they are unknown, and committing their crimes there.139 This issue 
was not over looked by legislatures during the enactment of these laws. For example, in 
the debate in the New York assembly over that state’s SORNL one of the assemblymen 
noted that “[a]ll any pervert has to do who lives on my street is hop on the subway and in 
five minutes he is in another community where there are children who are going to the 
store for milk or going to school.”140 
                                                                                                                                                 
135 Id. at 154 (concluding that the Massachusetts SORNL has a limited ability to prevent stranger-predatory 
sex crimes). 
 
136  Kim Curtis, Sex-Offender Registries Flawed Across Nation; Non-Profit Group Estimates that up-to-
date Address Lacking for 1 in 4 People who should Appear on List, AKRON BEACON J. (OHIO), Feb. 7, 
2003, at 7. See also Houston, supra note 36 at 733 (pointing out claims that only fifty percent of sex 
offenders have in fact registered). 
 
137  Curtis, Id. 
 
138 Dugan, supra  note 93 at 635 (noting that “sex offenders hear about the harassment and decide they 
would rather not register, despite the risk of getting caught, rather than be harassed by the public”); Bedarf, 
supra  note 53 at 909 (noting that “harassment is likely to drive a sex offender to… fail to comply with his 
community notification duties”).  
 
139 Robert E. Freeman-Longo, Reducing Sexual Abuse in America: Legislating Tougher Laws or Public 
Education and Prevention, 23 NEW ENG. J. ON CRIM. & CIV CONFINEMENT 303, 317 (1997) (noting that 
“[t]here is nothing to stop the sexual abuser who want to molest children or rape women from going into 
neighboring communities, where he or she is not known, to select a victim”). 
 
140 Filler, supra  note 44 at 345 (quoting New York assemblyman Sullivan). 
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In sum, this subsection has demonstrated that despite the fact that SORNLs and 
their public notification provisions aim to prevent future crimes, their ability to do so is 
questionable. In fact, given their limited value, voices calling to shift resources from 
these programs to other social programs are beginning to emerge.141 In the next 
subsection I will turn to develop an alternative approach towards SORNLs.  
 
3. A Punitive Approach Towards SORNLs 
Thus far we have seen that it is unclear whether the preventative value of 
SORNLs justifies the amount of resources devoted to them. Nevertheless, these laws can 
fulfill an additional function, namely, to punish sex offenders by inducing nonlegal 
sanctions. In order to demonstrate the punitive nature of SORNLs I will review the 
nonlegal sanctions that are triggered by them, and argue that these sanctions are punitive 
and not preventative, since they are mainly driven by a preference for reciprocity and by 
a norm of sanctioning sex offenders. 
 
According to the preventative approach towards SORNLs, the nonlegal sanctions 
induced by these laws can mainly be seen as preventative measures taken by members of 
society, who wish to minimize the risk associated with living in proximity to sex 
offenders. Undoubtedly, SORNLs do cause sex offenders to suffer from such nonlegal 
sanctions. SORNLs have, for instance, caused offenders to lose income opportunities that 
involve close work with potential victims.142 Nevertheless, a closer look at the sanctions 
that are incurred by sex offenders as a result of SORNLs demonstrates that these 
sanctions are not merely preventative. 
 
First, one can see that sanctions are applied to sex offenders by individuals who  
agree to do so because they wish to avoid nonlegal sanctions, which are applied to those 
who refuse to sanction offenders. For example, employers have terminated sex offenders’ 
employment because they were concerned from the reactions of their customers if they 
would have continued to employ offenders.143 This kind of behavior is in line with 
                                                                                                                                                 
 
141 See, e.g., Editorial, Megan’s Law: Good Intentions, Impossible Task , J. & COURIER, Feb. 12, 2003, at 7 
(arguing that funds spent on the implementation of SORNLs “could be spent on improved day care for 
children of poor working parents. It’s money that could be spent in the nation’s classrooms. It’s money that 
could go toward after-school programs for latchkey kids”). 
 
142 See, e.g., Feldman, supra note 124 at 1106 (noting that in California regis tration and notification 
managed to detect sex offenders working in positions that might place potential victims at risk). 
 
143 See Brian D. Gallagher, Now that We Know Where they are, What Do We Do With them?: The 
Placement of Sex Offenders in the Age of Megan’s Laws, 7 WIDENER J. PUB. L. 39, 53 (1997) (reporting of 
a case in which a business rescinded a job offer to released sex offender due to negative public reaction); 
Doe v. Pataki, 940 F.Supp. 603, 610 (S.D.N.Y. 1998) (describing an incident in which a gas station that 
employed a sex offender was boycotted); Brief of the Office of the Public Defender of the State of New 
Jersey et al. as Amici Curiae in Support of Respondents at 9, Smith v. Doe 538 U.S. 84 (2003) (No. 01-
729) [hereinafter: New Jersey Public Defender Amici Brief] (reporting that an offender was refused a job 
because of publicity concerns of the hiring company) and 17-8 (describing a case in which after the 
offender’s employer acknowledged that “He [the offender ] has demonstrated outstanding performance. He 
has shown his ability to be an excellent worker and I find him to be a highly respected person in our 
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nonlegal sanctions that are driven by a sanctioning norm, which is enforced by a 
secondary set of nonlegal sanctions.  
 
An additional characteristic of the nonlegal sanctions generated by SORNLs, 
which indicates that these sanctions are punitive, is that in a significant amount of cases 
the sanctions are directed against the family members of the offenders.144 For example, in 
a research conducted in Wisconsin two thirds of the offenders reported some kind of 
negative effects on the lives of their family members.145 It is difficult to see how 
ridiculing a son of an offender to the point he chooses to leave his school’s football team 
can be categorized as a preventative measure.146 Rather, these cases indicate that the 
sanctioning of sex offenders has become a focal point for a sanctioning norm in those 
communities.147 Since norm driven nonlegal sanctions are based on the willingness to 
engage in costly acts, publicly sanctioning the children of sex offenders can serve just as 
good a signal as sanctioning the offenders themselves.148  
 
A third characteristic of the sanctions that are applied to sex offenders is that they 
are arbitrary, singeling out specific individuals for no apparent reason. 149 This picture is 
                                                                                                                                                 
company” the employer nevertheless terminated the offender’s employment due to public pressure). Other 
examples include community members who simply fear to voice opposition to public reactions towards sex 
offenders. In Texas a resident who voiced an opinion against the local notification policies refused to 
identify himself to the media out of fear of retaliation. See Tracey-Lynn Claough, Neighbors Warned About 
Sex Offender, DALLAS MORNING NEWS, May 24, 1996, at A1. 
 
144 See, e.g., Pataki, 940 F. Supp. at 609 (noting a case in which members of the family of a sex offender 
were harassed); Small, supra  note 8 at 1466 (reporting of a case in which the offenders’ sister in law and 
her children were harassed and even shot at). 
 
145 Richard Z. Zevitz & Mary Ann Farkas, Sex Offender Community Notification: Managing High Risk 
Criminal or Exacting Further Vengeance?, 18 BEHAV. SCI. & L. 375, 383 (2000). It should be noted that 
this number overstates the number of nonlegal sanctions that are aimed towards family members since it 
includes cases in which family members saw themselves hurt solely by the publication of the offenders’ 
name. See also  THE NAT’L CRIM. JUST . ASS’N, SEX OFFENDER REGISTRATION AND NOTIFICATION: 
PROBLEM AVOIDANCE & BARRIERS TO IMPLEMENTATION, & SEX OFFENDER REGISTRATION & 
NOTIFICATION COSTS SURVEY RESULTS 32 (1999) [hereinafter: NAT’L CRIM. JUST . ASS’N STUDY] (pointing 
out that children of offenders are being harassed).  
 
146 Zevitz & Farkas, id.  
 
147 See Posner, supra note 3 at 93 (pointing out that norm based nonlegal sanctions might target relatives of 
wrongdoers). 
 
148 To be sure, the sanctioning of the children of sex offenders can also be explained on a rather crude 
theory of reciprocity. Since inflicting harm to the children of an offender will cause psychic harm to the 
offender himself, one can view these sanctions as a way to sanction the offender himself.  
 
149 Richard G. Zevitz & Marry Ann Farkas, Sex offender Community Notification: Assessing the Impact in 
Wisconsin, National Institute of Justice - Research in Brief at 9 (2000) (available at 
http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/nij). See also Scott Matson & Roxanna Lieb, Community Notification in 
Washington State: 1996 Survey of Law Enforcement (1996) (available at 
http://www.wa.gov/wsipp/crime/cprot.html) (pointing out that communities can be unpredictable in their 
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consistent with nonlegal sanctions that are driven by a sanctioning norm, and not with 
preventative nonlegal sanctions. As we have seen, sanctioning norms will tend to emerge 
around focal points of a signaling equilibrium, and these focal points might be 
determined arbitrarily. On the other hand, one would expect preventative nonlegal 
sanctions based on a rational thought process to be applied in an apparently logical 
fashion.  
 
Another repeat theme in the description of the sanctions that target sex offenders 
is that they are conducted by groups rather by individuals,150 and reflect a “lynch-mob 
attitude”. 151 Group based nonlegal sanctions are an indicator that signaling behavior is at 
hand. They demonstrate that participation in sanctioning offenders is driven by a need to 
conform to the norms of the group applying the sanctions, and not by a personal decision 
aimed at protecting the individual from future harms.152  
 
Finally, it should be noted that the acts of violent vigilantism suffered by sex 
offenders are consistent with punitive, rather than preventative nonlegal sanctions. Since 
the adoption of SORNLs sex offenders have been subjected to acts such as threats,153 
vandalism of their property, 154 physical assaults,155 and gunshots fired at their houses.156 
                                                 
150 For example, in one reported case a Wisconsin 60 year old man in a wheelchair was driven out of his 
house by a demonstration with 100 participants (this was only one of the eight times he was forced to 
move). See Mary Zahn, Watching the Offenders, MILWAUKEE J. SENTINEL, March 29, 1998, at 1; 
Gallagher, supra note 143 at 53 (reporting that community members held a rally to protest the release of a 
sex offender); New Jersey Public Defender Amici Brief, supra  note 143 at 8 (reporting on a demonstration 
with 250 participants near a house of an offender). This reality is true out of the United States as well. See 
Dugan, id. (describing reactions in England).  
 
151 Amy L. Van Duyn, Note, The Scarlet Letter Branding: A Constitutional Analysis of Community 
Notification Provisions In Sex Offender Statues, 47 DRAKE L. REV. 635, 650 (1999); Dugan, supra note 93 
at 618. 
 
152 Posner, supra note 3 at 93 (noting that “[t]he reason people join mobs is that it is better to be a member 
of a mob than its target”). 
 
153 Small, supra  note 8 at 1466 (reporting on death threats made against the sister in law of an offender); 
New Jersey Public Defender Amici Brief, supra  note 143 at 8 (reporting that offender received letter 
spelled out of newspaper cuttings saying “We’ll be watching you asshole”), 9 (reporting that offender was 
yelled at “Stop fucking little girls. I’m going to kill you” and later was attacked by a man wearing a ski 
mask and carrying a gun that who told him “If you don’t get out of this neighborhood I’m going to kill 
you”), and 11-2 (reporting on several incidents of threats that were made to offenders).  
 
154 See, e.g., Jenny A. Montana, Note, An Ineffective Weapon in the Fight Against Child Sexual Abuse: New 
Jersey’s Megan’s Law, 3 J. L. & POL'Y 569, 579 (1995) (reporting on the case of Joseph Gallardo, a 
Washington sex offender whose house was burned down); Zevitz & Farkas, supra  note 145 at 383 
(describing a case in which the car of the offender was vandalized); Small, supra note 8 at 1466 (same); 
New Jersey Public Defender Amici Brief, id. at 12 (describing a series of such incidents including placing 
human feces on the steps of offender’s home, slashing the tires of offender’s car and destroying offender’s 
mailboxes). 
 
155 Pataki, 940 F.Supp. at 610 (describing an incident in which an offender was punched in the face); New 
Jersey Public Defender Amici Brief, id. at 9 (describing an incident in which two men broke into the 
offenders’ residence and attacked a man they mistook for him) and 10-11 (describing an incident in which 
an offender was struck with a crowbar). 
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Despite the fact that these acts are relatively rare,157 they are still a significant sanction 
from the perspective of potential offenders, since they are very large in those cases in 
which they are applied.  
 
In sum, the picture arising from the different characteristics of the nonlegal 
sanctions that are generated by SORNLs is of a social process, which is well beyond 
communities taking precautionary steps. This conclusion is also supported by the only 
available systematic study of the nonlegal sanctions incurred by sex offenders as a result 
of SORNL. This study reported that 83 percent of offenders were excluded from their 
place of residence,158 and over 50 percent were terminated from their place of 
employment.159 These large numbers seem to reflect a general sanctioning norm that sex 
offenders are subject to.  
 
Having argued that SORNLs should be viewed as a punitive tool, the question 
that remains to be addressed is should they be used as such a tool. Though one cannot 
offer a definitive answer to this question, one can point out several characteristics of 
SORNLs that might make them an effective sanction generating tool. SORNLs single out 
sex offenders as a distinct class of criminals that is subjected to special legal treatment. 
This is of importance, since in order for a norm of inflicting nonlegal sanctions to 
emerge, there needs to exist a focal point around which this norm will be formed. The 
law can create such a focal point since it enjoys moral power and tends to focus public 
attention. 160 By singling out sex offenders, SORNLs have created a focal point for a 
signalling equilibrium, in which a norm of sanctioning sex offenders can emerge.  
 
An additional reason policymakers should use shame sanctions only with respect 
to a limited group of criminals is that the cost of inducing these sanctions will rise as their 
use becomes common. The explanation for this can be found in the theoretical analysis of 
nonlegal sanctions presented above. With respect to preference driven nonlegal sanctions, 
the conventional assumption of marginally decreasing utility points out that over time 
people will derive less pleasure from sanctioning, and will therefore engage in less of it. 
As to norm based nonlegal sanctions, since these sanctions are based on signaling, 
individuals might stop sanctioning once they manage to send a credible signal as to their 
type.  
                                                                                                                                                 
 
156 Robert Hanley, Neighbor Admits Firing Gun Into Home of Paroled Rapist, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 10, 1998, 
at 10B (reporting on the case of a shooting at the house of a sex offender in Linden New Jersey); New 
Jersey Public Defender Amici Brief, id. at 8 (describing a shooting incident).   
 
157 See Zevitz & Farkas, supra  note 145 at 381 (reporting that in only three percent of the cases did sex 
offenders report acts of vigilantism); Matson & Lieb, supra note 149 at 15 (reporting that 3.5 percent of 
offenders report cases of harassment). 
 




160 For an analysis of the ability of the law to create focal points see generally Richard McAdams, A Third 
Model of Legal Compliance, Testing for Expressive Effects in Hawk/Dove Games (2003) (unpublished 
manuscript on file with author). 
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Finally, singling out sex crimes is desirable for several reasons. First, from the 
perspective of offenders, sex is an ideal context to inflict suffering through shame. 
Psychologically, we are inclined to be shameful of issues that relate to our sexual activity, 
especially when this activity is considered deviant.161 This unique characteristic of sex 
points out that sex offenders will suffer from a substantial internal nonlegal sanction 
when their acts are publicly exposed. Second, from the perspective of the sanctioning 
public, there exists a cross-cultural consensus over the shamefulness of sex crimes.162 
Despite some potential disagreements as to what constitutes a sex crime,163 it would seem 
that this consensus carries on to American society. 164 Even among criminals, sex 
offenders are considered to be worthy of sanctioning and shaming.165 This characteristic 
of sex assures us that the public will unite under the sex offender banner, and inflict 
external nonlegal sanctions to sex offenders. It is for this reason that in England during 
the days of the pillory this sanction was mainly used to punish sexually oriented 
crimes.166 Thus, unlike the arguments presented by some commentators,167 basing the 
sanctioning of sex offenders on nonlegal sanctions has significant advantages. 
                                                 
161 See Whitman, supra note 6 1064-5 and sources cited there (1998) (describing the connection between 
shame and sex). 
 
162 See James T. Tedeschi & Richard B Felson, VIOLENCE , AGGRESSION, AND COERCIVE ACTIONS 334 
(1994) (pointing out that rape was one of the three most heavily punished crimes in all societies in a survey 
of 110 societies).  
 
163 A clear exception to this is the attitude of Americans towards sodomy laws and homosexual acts. As 
was evident from the public reactions to the recent ruling of the Supreme Court in Lawrence v. Texas 123 
S.Ct. 2472 (U.S. 2003) which held sodomy laws unconstitutional, there are groups in America that believe 
that homosexual acts should be criminalized and those who commit them should be shamed, while others 
believe that such acts should be legal and there is no shame in committing them. 
 
164 See, e.g., Kunz, supra  note 36 at 454 (“Few crimes spark as strong or distinctive an aversion as sexual 
offenses against children”); Wayne A. Logan, Liberty Interests in the Preventive State: Procedural Due 
Process and Sex Offender Community Notification Laws, 89 J. CRIM. & CRIMINOLOGY 1167, 1167 (1999) 
(“Sex offenders are the scourge of modern America”); Bruce J. Winick, Sex Offender Law in the 1990s: A 
Therapeutic Jurisprudence Analysis, 4 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL’Y & L. 505, 506 (1998) (“perhaps more than 
any other group, sex offenders are the pariahs of our society. They deserve this treatment and worse, most 
people think, and this social consensus is reflected in our present legal rules and practices”); Alison Virag 
Greissman, Note, The Fate of “Megan’s Law” in New York, 18 CARDOZO L. REV. 181, 181 (1996) 
(“Sexual crimes disgust, anger, and frighten Americans in a way that no other human act does”). 
 
165 See, e.g ., Rob Tripp, The Bernardo Trial: Fellow Inmates Despise Homolka, OTTAWA CITIZEN, July 11, 
1995, at A3 (“[t]here is an unwritten code that regards sex offenders and child abusers lowest on the prison 
pecking order”); The Supreme Court, 2002 Term Leading Cases, 117 HARV. L. REV. 327, 339 (2003) 
(“Within the hierarchy of prisons, moreover, sex offenders in general - and child molesters in particular - 
are considered the lowest of the low”); Gallagher, supra note 143 at 63 (quoting a prison inmate describing 
the harsh treatment child molesters are subjected to in prison). 
 
166 See Beattie, supra  note 51 at 464-65. Furthermore, even as the use of the pillory diminished its main use 
continued to be for sex offenders. Beattie, id. at 615 (noting that three out of the five crimes that were 
punished by the pillory were of a sexual nature).  
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In sum, this subsection demonstrated that SORNLs are in fact punitive and that 
using them in order to sanction sex offenders might be a sensible policy. Nonetheless, 
given the limited information we currently hold regarding the actual effects created by 
SORNLs, this conclusion is tentative in nature. I now turn to evaluate some of the 
potential problems using SORNLs as punishment might cause. 
 
4. SORNLs, Stigmas, and Marginal Deterrence 
In the general discussion above I argued that sanctioning regimes based on 
nonlegal sanctions run the risk of raising the crime rate of the criminals that will be 
subjected to these sanctions.168 This argument was based both on psychological aspects 
of stereotypes and stigmas, and on economic aspects of marginal deterrence. In this 
subsection I shall demonstrate that SORNLs might in fact create such a problem. 
 
There are two reasons to suspect that SORNLs might trigger the psychological 
process associated with stereotypes and stigmas.169 First, SORNLs constantly remind 
offenders of their social status and expected behavior. As one offender put it, “It’s hard 
to, in a manner of speaking, to move on and try to put things behind when you’re 
constantly reminded by the rules that you are a sex offender and the rules more or less 
make you feel like it just happened yesterday….The rules don’t let you have a normal life 
and the rules are a constant reminder that you’re not a normal person.”170 This state of 
mind may exacerbate the self- fulfilling aspects of stigmas.171 Second, SORNLs might 
cause sex offenders the mental processes that trigger self- fulfilling behavior by lowering 
their expectation with respect to their own performance,172 and by creating stress and 
anxiety.173  
                                                                                                                                                 
167 See, e.g., Whitman, supra  note 6 at 1092 (opposing the use of shame sanctions in the context of sex 
crimes); Bedarf, supra  note 53 at 912 (arguing that “in the context of sex offenses, where the community’s 
reaction is highly emotional, and sometimes violent, shaming is inappropriate”). 
 
168 See supra  notes 54-67 at accompanying text. 
 
169  To be sure, it should be noted that to this day the stereotype threat literature has not evaluated whether 
the stereotypes associated with sex offenders trigger this effect. This is not surprising given the 
methodological problems of conducting experiments aimed at testing such a hypothesis and the fact that 
this is a young and emerging line of literature. Nevertheless, the studies of stereotype threat do point out 
that the mechanism described within them could be applied to any group. See, e.g., Wheeler & Petty, supra 
note 58 at 804 (noting that “a member of any group targeted by negative stereotypes can show stereotype 
threat effects in the domains relevant to the stereotype”); and Steele, supra  note 58 at 617 (stating that 
stereotype threat “affects the members of any group about whom there exists some generally known 
negative stereotype”). 
 
170  Zevitz & Faraks, supra  note 145 at 385. 
 
171  See Steele & Aronson, supra  note 58 at 806-8. 
 
172 See, e.g., Winick, supra note 164 at 557 (noting that SORNLs produce “the feeling that improvement or 
change is hopeless”); Bedarf, supra  note 53 at 911 n151 (quoting an offender stating that “I got the feeling 
no one cares about me, so why should I care about myself and what I do?”). 
 
173  As one sex offender explained “…Well, there is no more pressure than being exploited by media, the 
people you work with, the people you live with, relatives, and so the pressure is constantly there. And 
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Turning to the economic perspective, SORNLs seem to create a problem of 
marginal deterrence, since in many cases they deprive offenders of the opportunity to 
regain any new social capital. Although SORNLs do not attach a physical mark to sex 
offenders, as did branding punishments in eighteenth century England or scarlet letter 
punishments in colonial times, they come as close as possible to such a scheme. SORNLs 
attach specific information to sex offenders in a way that this information becomes a part 
of their identity. This information causes detrimental consequences, including loss of 
housing, disruption of personal relationships, and loss of employment.174 Thus, sex 
offenders who are subject to SORNLs find themselves with little to no social capital, and 
therefore the future nonlegal sanctions of these individuals are eliminated. In fact, it has 
been reported that some offenders have chosen to return to prison since that is their only 
housing option. 175 At the extreme, SORNLs could even bring sex offenders to situations 
in which they literally have nothing to lose. This can be seen in several cases in which 
offenders committed suicide as a direct result of notification. 176 These cases reflect a 
potential breakdown of a system of deterrence, since there is perhaps no threat that the 
law can use in order to deter individuals who are willing to commit suicide.177   
 
On the other hand, it should be noted that the registration aspects of SORNLs 
might have an advantage from a deterrence perspective. A unified database that is at the 
disposal of law enforcement agencies might raise the probability of detection for past 
offenders. This would especially be the case in those jurisdictions that require sex 
offenders as part of their registration scheme to submit DNA samples.178 Thus, SORNLs 
might raise the expected sanction facing past offenders, and could therefore deter them 
from committing future crimes. 
                                                                                                                                                 
because they’re [sex offenders] miserable, then that would put them in that cycle to recommit the offense”. 
Zevitz & Faraks, supra note 145 at 388. 
174 See supra  Section III 3. 
 
175 Zevitz & Faraks, supra note 145 at 382. 
 
176 See, e.g ., AP, Suicide Is Recalled as Maine Revisits Megan's Law, Released Sex Offender Shot Himself 
After Neighborhood Notification, WASH. POST , Feb. 17, 1998, at A2 (reporting on an offender committing 
suicide just two days after notification);  Todd S. Purdum, Suicide Tied to Megan's Law, N.Y. TIMES, July 9, 
1998 at A16 (reporting about two separate incidents of offenders committing suicide after notification); 
New Jersey Public Defender Amici Brief, supra  note 143 at 22-3 (describing numerous incidents of 
offenders committing suicide as a result of notification).  
It should be noted that the problem of individuals that are subjected to shaming sanctions and are 
driven to suicide is not unique to American culture or to the context of SORNLs. See e.g ., Braithwaite, 
supra  note 66 at 138 (noting that cases of suicide due to corporate malpractice are common in Japan); J. 
Beattie, OTHER CULTURES 176 (1964) (relying on work of others to report that shame caused suicide 
among Tobriand Islanders); Persons, supra  note 9 at 1527 (reporting on a case of a patron of a prostitute 
who committed suicide after his name was published in a newspaper as part of a shaming scheme). 
 
177  See Alan M. Dershowtiz, WHY TERRORISM WORKS: UNDERSTANDING THE THREAT , RESPONDING TO 
THE CHALLENGE 29 (2002) (pointing out that in the context of suicide bombers “the usual deterrent strategy 
of threatening death to the perpetrator will not work”). 
 
178  As of 2003 29 states collected DNA samples from sex offenders. See Terry & Furlong, SEX OFFENDER 
REGISTRATION AND COMMUNITY NOTIFICATION (2nd ed., 2003) III-3-III4. 
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5. Plea Bargaining in the Shadow of SORNLs 
In this subsection I turn to evaluate the effects of SORNLs on plea bargaining.179 
The two main predictions of the theoretical framework developed above with respect to 
plea agreements were that mandatory registration will cause defendants to reject plea 
offers and opt for trials, and that this position will cause defendants and prosecutors to 
circumvent SORNL by pleading defendants to offenses that do not trigger registration.180 
Regretfully, since the enactment of modern day SORNLs no empirical studies have been 
conducted to evaluate their effects on plea bargain negotiations. Thus, the main evidence 
presented here will be anecdotal. Nevertheless, this evidence as a whole does present 
persuasive indications for the validity of the model. 
 
Several indications point out that defendants withdrew from plea agreements upon 
learning of the registration requirement that will be triggered by a conviction. 181 First, a 
significant amount of litigation has been dedicated to the question whether defendants 
may withdraw a plea for that reason.182 In addition, a similar picture arises from news 
reports covering sex crime cases. For example, in Maricopa County, Arizona, a defendant 
withdrew from a plea agreement that capped his prison sentence at three and a half years 
and opted for a trial that could end up in a prison sentence of over twenty-eight years, 
under the explicit argument that he was not aware of the registration requirement.183 In 
another case, a defendant who was accused of having sex with a teenage girl initially 
agreed to plead guilty to lewd and lascivious acts with a child younger than 16,184 yet 
after he learned of the registration requirements that he will be subjected to, he chose to 
                                                 
 
179 Generally, studies of SORNLs have overlooked their potential effects on plea bargaining behavior. For 
an exception see Kunz, supra  note 36 at 476-7 (noting intuitively that SRONL might result in fewer plea 
bargains and as a result in fewer sex offenders being punished). 
 
180 See supra  Section II 4.  
 
181 It should be noted that the fact that some defendants were not aware of the registration requirements 
might lead to some skepticism over the deterrence power of SORNLs. After all, a prerequisite for any 
punishment to be an effective deterrent is knowledge of the punishment. Nevertheless, one can expect that 
over time the registration requirements of SORNLs will become common knowledge. 
 
182 Generally courts have been reluctant to allow such withdraws. See, e.g ., Kaiser v. State, 641 N.W.2d 
900 (Minn. 2002) (denying petition to withdraw a guilty plea); State v. Anderson, No. 98074637, 2001 WL 
1608560 (Minn. App. Dec. 18, 2001) (same); State v. Koenig, 2001 WL 950044 (Minn. App. Aug. 21, 
2001) (same); Ducker v. State, 45 S.W.3d 791, (Tex. App.-Dallas, 2001) (same); State ex rel. Chauvin v. 
State, 814 So.2d 1, (La. App. 1 Cir. 2000) (same); People v. Clark, 704 N.Y.S.2d 149 (N.Y.A.D. 3 Dept. 
2000) (same). But see State v. Wiita, 744 So.2d 1232 (Fla. App. 4 Dist. 1999) (allowing defendant to 
withdraw guilty plea due to the potential effects the state’s new SORNL). To be sure, such withdraws do 
not necessarily reflect cases which ended up going to trial. In some instances it is quite possible that if a 
withdrawal was allowed the parties could then agree on a lower legal sanction and avoid trial. 
 
183  Susan Carroll, Teen out of Plea Deal in Sex Case, Ex-Football Player will Face Jury Trial in Assault on 
Girl, THE ARIZ. REPUBLIC, Feb. 15, 2003, at B5. 
 
184 Brett Barrouquere, Man may Withdraw Plea of No Content in Sex Case, SARASOTA HEARLD-TRIB, Aug. 




Published by University of Michigan Law School Scholarship Repository, 2004
SEX, SHAME, AND THE LAW 39 
rescind his plea and go to trial. 185 Finally, policymakers influencing sex offender 
legislation have voiced concerns regarding the tendency of offenders to reject plea 
agreements as a result of registration.186 
 
As to the second prediction, namely, that prosecutors and defendants will attempt 
to contract around SORNLs, a good place to begin the examination is California, which 
was the first state to adopt a sex offender registration law back in the 1940s. Evidence 
from California dating back to the 1960s indicates that prosecutors and defendants 
contracted around the registration requirements imposed by California law by using 
section 650½ of the California Penal Code,187 which criminalized “openly outrageous 
public decency” and did not trigger registration. When the California Court invalidated 
this piece of legislation, because it found it to be vague, it acknowledged that at the time 
the main use of section 650½ was to allow persons accused of sex crimes to plead guilty 
to it so they could avoid the stigma associated with registration. 188 Additional evidence of 
this practice was pointed out by an empirical study conducted in the county of Los 
Angeles regarding the enforcement and administration of the sections of the California 
Criminal Code that regulate adult homosexual behavior.189 As noted by this study, section 
650½ was commonly used to deal with judicial concerns over nonlegal sanctions, such as 
lose of employment, that could have resulted from registration. 190  
 
Additional indications for the contracting around hypothesis can be found in 
media reports. The highly publicized case of Gary Wayne Jackson, a repeat sex offender 
from Oklahoma, who succeeded in avoiding registration by pleading to nonsexual 
charges, brought this practice to the attention of the Oklahoma public.191 Yet Jackson’s 
case was not unique. According to one newspaper, during the year 2001 forty-seven cases 
in Tulsa County were identified as cases in which allegations of a sexual nature were 
                                                 
185 Brett Barrouquere, Menard Rescinds Plea in Sex Case, SARASOTA HEARLD-TRIB., Sept. 9, 1999, at 3B. 
 
186 As one member of Maine’s Commission to Improve Community Safety and Sex Offender 
Accountability noted “requiring sex offenders to register for life may make them refuse a plea agreement”. 
See David Hench, Recommendation Due on Sex Offender Rules, PORTLAND PRESS HERALD, Dec. 1, 2003, 
at 1A. 
 
187 CAL. PEN. CODE § 650½ (West, 1957). 
  
188 In re Davis, 242 Cal.App.2d 645, 666 n.21 (Cal.App. 2 Dist. 1966). 
 
189 See The Consenting Adult Homosexual and the Law: An Empirical Study of Enforcement and 




191 Bill Braun, Prison Not Part of Plea Proposal, TULSA WORLD, Jan. 18, 2002 at 1. A second case that 
took place in the same time frame and seems to have also affected public opinion on the matter is the case 
of Cory B. West. West was originally charged with one count of first-degree rape and two counts of sexual 
battery. He eventually reached a plea agreement with prosecutors according to which he was granted a 
deferred sentence, which allowed the case to be dismissed with no conviction if West completes a four-year 
probation. See Bill Braun, Plea Deal Nets Man no Time in Sex Case, TULSA WORLD, Feb. 1, 2002, at 13. 
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pleaded down to a nonsexual charge.192 A similar picture arises out of a report of a case 
in Georgia, in which apparently the defendant and the prosecutor cooperated in order to 
rescind a registration condition even though the Georgia SORNL required registration. 193  
 
In sum, we can see that there exists evidence that supports the predictions of the 
theoretical bargaining model. Yet aside from the direct effects on sanctioning, the plea 
bargaining behavior surrounding SORNLs has unique effects due to the specific context 
of these laws. First, this behavior might lead law enforcement agencies to have less 
information about sex offenders, since without SORNLs more sex offenders would 
actually be convicted of sex crimes. Arguably, prosecutors might develop bargaining 
policies that will indicate to them what the actual underlying offense pleaded out of was. 
For instance, prosecutors in California in the 1960s who used Section 650½ of the 
California Penal Code as an offense to plead out of registration requirements, were aware 
of the special nature of a conviction under this section.194 Nevertheless, this type of 
policy is more indicative of the existence of a problem then it is of the fact that it can be 
solved. Such policies are by their very nature local. At best, in the 1960s only California 
prosecutors might have been aware of the special meaning of a conviction under Section 
650½. Second, this behavior might have a detrimental effect on the rehabilitation of sex 
offenders. Rehabilitation in general requires that offenders acknowledge the acts they 
have committed, and atone for them as part of an educational process.195 This process is 
of specific importance in the treatment of sex offenders,196 who tend to live in denial as to 
the wrongfulness of their acts.197 Pleading sex offenders to nonsexual crimes, however, 
might exacerbate the denial of sex offenders, and this, in turn, might lower the severity of 
                                                 
192 Bill Braun, State Firm in Registration of Sex Offenders, TULSA WORLD, Sept. 22, 2002, at A15. See also 
Simon, supra  note 127 at 301 (describing the case of Richard Allen Davis, a repeat sex offender from 
California who managed to avoid registration by pleading to nonsexual offenses). 
193  Sandy Hodson, Convict Must Join Registry for Sex Crime , AUGUSTA CHRONICLE, Feb. 5, 2003, at A1. 
 
194 See E. A. Riddle, Compulsory Registration: A Vehicle of Mercy Discarded, 3 W. CAL. L. REV. 195, 198 
n18 (1967) (quoting an interview with members of the San Diego City Attorney’s staff). 
 
195 See, e.g., Stephanos Bibas, Harmonizing Substantive Criminal Law and Criminal Procedure: The Case 
of Alford and Nolo Contendere Pleas, 88 CORNELL L. REV. 1361, 1390 (2003) (noting that “punishment 
reforms and deters in part by educating the offender and society”); Stephen P. Garvey, Punishment as 
Atonement, 46 UCLA  L. REV. 1801, 1804-29 (1999) (presenting a theory of punishment based on 
atonement); R. A. Duff, TRIALS AND PUNISHMENT  254-62 (1986) (presenting a theory as to the role of 
penance and reconciliation within a punitive system). 
 
196 See, e.g., Bibas, id. at 1395-6 (noting the importance of admitting wrongdoing in the treatment of sex 
offenders); Stefan J. Padfield, Self-Incrimination and Acceptance of Responsibility in Prison Sex Offender 
Treatment Programs, 49 U. KAN. L. REV. 487, 497-8 (2001) (noting that acceptance of responsibility is a 
key part in the treatment of sex offenders); Judith V. Becker, The Science of Sex Offenders: Risk 
Assessment, Treatment, and Prevention , 4 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL'Y & L. 116, 128 (1998) (noting that within 
the cognitive therapy approach to treating sex offenders, the most accepted method used at the time, 
treatment focuses on eliminating offender’s denial). 
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the act in the eyes of offenders.198 Hence, quite ironically, SORNLs might cause a rise in 
recidivism rates.199 
* * * 
 
 In conclusion, in this Section I have argued that SORNLs should be viewed as a 
punitive tool. Furthermore, I have argued that using SORNLs in order to sanction sex 
offenders might be justified on economic grounds. Nonetheless, the Section did point out 
some of the problems that might be associated with using SORNLs as a punitive tool. 
 
IV. POLICY IMPLICATIONS 
 
In this Section I will turn to evaluate the policy implications of the punitive 
approach towards SORNLs with respect to five topics: the retroactive application of 
SORNLs, the legal limitations on the use of SORNLs as punishment, the rights of sex 
offenders to a risk assessment hearing prior to public notification, the reintegration of sex 
offenders, and the plea bargaining behavior created by SORNLs. Generally, the 
discussion in this Section will focus on notification, and not the registration aspects of 
SORNLs. This limitation is made since the focus of this Article is on the nonlegal 
sanctions triggered by notification. 
 
1. The Retroactive Application of SORNLs 
An area of law that has generated a substantial amount of litigation with respect to 
SORNLs is whether these laws violate the ex-post- facto clause of the federal 
constitution. 200 The ex-post facto clause applies to four different sets of cases.201 First, 
laws that criminalize an act that was not previously criminal. Second, laws that make the 
crime greater than it originally was at the time it was committed. Third, laws that raise 
the punishment that was attached to the crime. And finally, laws that change the rules of 
evidence in a way that allows for less or different testimony than that that was required at 
the time the offense was committed. The argument made by sex offenders falls under the 
third option, effectively stating that SORNLs create an additional punishment that is 
inflicted retroactively to sex offenders. 
 
The ex-post- facto doctrine aims to serve three main goals. First, it assures 
individuals will receive fair warning, allowing them to reasonably rely on the legal 
                                                 
198 NAT’L. CRIM. JUST . ASS’N STUDY, supra  note 145 at 8.  
 
199 Bibas, supra  note 195 at 1396-7 (pointing out that denial might result in higher recidivism rates for sex 
offenders). 
 
200 U.S. CONST . ART . I, § 10 (“No State shall…pass any…ex post facto law”). 
 
201 The original categorization was set out in Calder v. Bull 3 U.S. 386, 390 (U.S. 1798). This 
categorization is still used both by courts (see, e.g., Carmell v. Texas, 529 U.S. 513, 521-22 (U.S. 2000)) 
and by commentators (see, e.g., Danielle Kitson, It’s an Ex-Post Fact: Supreme Court Misapplies the Ex-
Post Facto Clause to Criminal Procedure Statutes, 91 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 429, 434 (2001)). 
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situation at the time during which they act.202 Second, it acts as a check on the power of 
government.203 More specifically, it prevents legislatures from imposing vindictive or 
arbitrary legislation on unpopular groups or individuals.204 By doing so, it protects the 
separation of powers between the legislative and the judicial branches of government.205 
Finally, the court recently recognized an independent fairness interest in having the 
government abide by the rules that it created.206 Given this background, I will view the 
ex-post- facto clause as an exogenous moral constraint on a sanctioning regime, which 
does not necessarily serve any economic purpose.207 
 
Ex post facto claims regarding SORNLs have been brewing within the legal 
system for a significant amount of time, with courts reaching contradictory results. At the 
state level, several Supreme Courts reached conflicting conclusions as to the 
constitutionality of the retroactive provisions of their state’s SORNL. 208 Similarly, federal 
circuit courts reached conflicting outcomes on the issue.209 This difference of opinion set 
the ground for the Supreme Court to take the matter under consideration. 210 
  
                                                 
202 See, e.g., Weaver v. Graham, 450 U.S. 24, 28-9 (U.S.Fla. 1981); Miller v. Florida, 482 U.S. 423, 429-30 
(U.S.Fla. 1987). 
 
203 See, e.g., Weaver , id. at 29; Miller, id. 
 
204 See Weaver, id; Calder 3 U.S. at 390. 
 
205 See Weaver, id. at 29 n10; Calder, id. at 389.  
 
206 See Carmell, 529 U.S. at 533. 
 
207 From the view point of economic analysis, the ex-post-facto doctrine is quite puzzling. The ex-post facto 
doctrine applies to legislative increases in the penalty. Yet from an economic perspective the crucial point 
from the viewpoint of potential criminals is not the magnitude of the sanction but rather the size of the 
expected sanction. Under this analysis potential criminals rely both on the size of the sanction set out by the 
legislature and on the probability of detection set out by enforcement agencies. For example, when the IRS 
raised the rate of audits from 1 to 2 percent in 1995 (see Joel Slemrod & Jon Bakija, TAXING OURSELVES 
152 (1st ed., 1996)) it did not raise the actual sanction inflicted to tax evaders, but it did double the expected 
sanction. Thus, under the economic model of crime we would expect to find a limitation on retroactive 
increases in the probability of detection as well. Nevertheless, the ex-post facto doctrine does not apply to 
such increases. Under American law the government has complete discretion to change that probability 
even in the extreme case in which it completely stopped enforcing a specific law. See District of Columbia 
v. Thompson Co., 346 U.S. 100, 113-14 (U.S. 1953) (holding that “[t]he failure of the executive branch to 
enforce a law does not result in its modification or repeal”).  
 
208 See, e.g., Kansas v. Meyers, 923 P.2d 1024. (striking down the Kansas notification provision); Olivieri 
v. Louisiana, 779 So.2d 735, 749-50 (La. 2001) (upholding the Louisiana notification provision); State v. 
Cook, 83 Ohio St. 3d 404 (Ohio, 1998) (upholding the Ohio notification provision). 
 
209 See, e.g., E.B. v. Poritz, 119 F.3d 1077 (3d Cir. 1997) (upholding the New Jersey notification 
provision); Doe I v. Otte, 259 F.3d 979 (9th Cir. 2001) (striking down the Alaska SORNL). 
 
210 Otte v. Doe, 534 U.S. 1126 (U.S. 2002) (granting cert).   
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In Smith v. Doe211 the Supreme Court evaluated the constitutionality of the Alaska 
Sex Offender Registration Act,212 which is applied to sex offenders retroactively. 213 The 
Alaska Act is not much different from SORNLs of other states. It includes a detailed 
registration scheme,214 and sets the ground for Internet based notification. 215 In its 
opinion, the Court followed its ruling in Kansas v. Hendricks,216 according to which the 
key distinction is between civil regulations that do not violate the ex-post- facto clause, 
and punishments that do violate the clause.217 To distinguish between the two the Court 
used a two-stage test.218 If the legislature intended the legislation to be punitive, that ends 
the analysis, and the law is punitive and unconstitutional. If, on the other hand, the 
legislature did not have a punitive intent, the court must find that the actual effects of the 
law are so punitive that they negate any civil intent of the legislature in order to invalidate 
the law.  
 
As to the first part of the Hendricks evaluation, the Smith Court found two 
indications to the non-punitive intent underlying the Alaska Act. First, the Alaska 
legislature’s express comments stated a civil objective.219 Second, the Alaska Act does 
not offer any procedural safeguards that are normally associated with the criminal 
process.220 Given these findings, the Court reached the conclusion that “the intent of the 
Alaska Legislature was to create a civil, non-punitive regime.”221 Having reached this 
                                                 
211 538 U.S. 84 (U.S. 2003). 
 
212 ALASKA STAT . §§ 12.63; 18.65.087 (hereinafter: the Alaska Act). 
 
213 Smith, 538 U.S. at 90. 
 
214 The Alaska Act requires all sex offenders present in Alaska to register with the department of correction 
(if they are incarcerated), or at an Alaska state trooper post or municipal police department (if they are not 
incarcerated) (ALASKA STAT . §§ 12.63.010 (a), (b)). Sex offenders must provide the state with details such 
as name, aliases, address, anticipated addresses, place of employment, date of birth, driver’s license 
number, information regarding cars the sex offender might have access to, and identifying features 
(ALASKA STAT. § 12.63.010 (b)(1)). Furthermore, the Alaska Act requires offenders to allow authorities to 
photograph and fingerprint them (ALASKA STAT . § 12.63.010 (b)(2)). 
 
215 With respect to notification, the Alaska Act requires the Alaska department of public safety to create a 
central registry of sex offenders (ALASKA STAT. § 18.65.087 (a)). The registry makes available to the 
public information such as the offender’s name, aliases, address, photograph, description, car information, 
and conviction information (ALASKA STAT . § 18.65.087 (b)). Alaska chose to use the Internet as the means 
by which this information is disseminated to the public (see  http://www.dps.state.ak.us/nSorcr/asp/). 
 
216 521 U.S. 346 (U.S. 1997). 
 




219 Id. at 93. 
 
220 Id. at 96.  
 
221 Id. In addition the Court dealt with two possible objections to its conclusion. First, the Court dealt with 
the fact that the part of the act dealing with registration was codified within the Alaska Criminal Procedure 
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conclusion, the Court turned to evaluate whether the actual effects of the Alaska Act may 
negate the legislatures’ intent. In its effect analysis the Court employed five of the seven 
Mendoza-Martinez factors that it found most relevant to the issue.222 The Court 
distinguished the Alaska Act from historical shaming sanctions by pointing out that the 
program created by it does not display offenders in public for ridicule and shaming.223 
The Court continued and brushed aside the arguments made as to the employment and 
housing effects of the Alaska Act as mere “conjecture”. 224 Finally, the Court found that 
the Alaska Act is not excessive, given the high recidivism rates among sex offenders and 
the importance of the goal of promoting public safety. 225 Thus, the Court concluded that 
the Alaska Act was non-punitive, and could be applied retroactively.226  
 
Since its publication, the Smith ruling has drawn criticism from legal 
scholars.227 This criticism has mainly focused on the displeasure from the outcome of the 
case, while not providing a comprehensive theoretical argument that would explain its 
                                                                                                                                                 
Code. Under Hendricks, the placement of an act within the state code may indicate the legislative intent 
underlying the act. See Hendricks, 521 U.S. at 361. Nevertheless, the Court pointed out that the Alaska 
Criminal Procedure Code contains several provisions that do not involve criminal punishment and thus the 
inclusion of the Alaska Act in it does not indicate that the legislative intent underlying the act was 
necessarily punitive. See Smith, 538 U.S. at 94-5. In addition the Court did not make much of the fact that 
following the adoption of the Alaska Act the state amended its Rules of Criminal Procedure requiring 
courts to inform the defendant in writing as to the potential registration requirements, see ALASKA RULE 
CRIM. PROC. § 11(c)(4), and to incorporate the registration requirements into the written judgments of 
offenders, see ALASKA STAT . § 12.55.148(a). The Court found that these facts were not indicatory of the 
legislative intent in this case since informing individuals of adverse effects of convictions is consistent with 
both civil and criminal policies. See Smith, 538 U.S. at 95-6. 
 
222 Smith, 538 U.S. at 97. The factors that the Court found to be most relevant to its analysis were whether 
the regulatory scheme: “has been regarded in our history and traditions as a punishment; imposes an 
affirmative disability or restraint; promotes the traditional aims of punishment; has a rational connection to 
a non-punitive purpose; or is excessive with respect to this purpose”. 
 
223 Id. at 98-9. It should be noted that even within its analysis of the effects of the Alaska Act the Court 
continued to stress the importance of legislative intent. Thus, when the court distinguished between 
colonial shaming sanctions and the Alaska Act it found that “[i]n contrast to the colonial shaming 
punishments, however, the State does not make the publicity and the resulting stigma an integral part of the 
objective of the regulatory scheme”. Id. (emphasis added). The Court then continued and noted “the 
purpose and the principal effect of notification are to inform the public for its own safety, not to humiliate 
the offender”. Id. (emphasis added). 
 
224 Id. at 100. 
 
225 Id. at 102-3. 
 
226 Id. at 105-6.   
 
227 See, e.g., The Supreme Court, 2002 Term Leading Cases, supra  note 165 at 334-9 (crit ically evaluating 
the court’s opinion in Smith). But see Kimberly B. Willkins, Sex Offender Registration and Community 
Notification Laws: Will These Laws Survive? , 37 U. RICH L. REV. 1245, 1277-8 (2003) (viewing SORNLs 
as aimed towards protecting the public rather than punishing offenders). 
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problems. Thus, I will now turn to analyze the Smith ruling in light of the theoretical 
framework regarding nonlegal sanctions presented above.228  
 
SORNLs represent an intersection between legal and nonlegal sanctions in which 
the law causes a specific group of people to be subjected to a series of nonlegal sanctions. 
Thus, when courts analyze the legal status of these laws, they should have a theory as to 
the nature of nonlegal sanctions in hand. Without such a theory, courts run the risk of 
developing a body of law that is not in touch with its real world effects. The underlying 
assumption throughout the Court’s analysis of the Alaska Act is that the adverse effects 
that offenders incur are preventative in nature. For example, the Court finds that “[t]he 
State makes the facts underlying the offenses and the resulting convictions accessible so 
members of the public can take the precautions they deem necessary before dealing with 
the registrant.”229 Other courts that upheld SORNLs against ex-post-facto challenges also 
adopted this line of reasoning.230 Yet this one-dimensional analysis ignores the fact that 
nonlegal sanctions are driven by three different forces – preferences, norms, and 
prevention. 231 To assume that SORNLs cause only, or even mostly, preventative nonlegal 
sanction is problematic. Rather, the evidence presented above demonstrated that SORNLs 
cause sex offenders to suffer from nonlegal sanctions that have little to do with 
                                                 
228 In the text I shall focus my critic of Smith on its treatment of nonlegal sanctions as a social phenomenon. 
Nevertheless, it should be noted that the opinion of the Court in Smith raises other difficulties. The Court’s 
overwhelming reliance on legislative intent as the touchstone for judicial constitutional scrutiny is 
undesirable for several reasons. First, the use of legislative intent in a federal context such as that of 
SORNLs could create inconsistencies among different jurisdictions. In effect, the Smith opinion deals 
exclusively with the question of the constitutionality of the Alaska Act. Under the holding an identical law 
adopted by another state that does have a punitive intent will be deemed unconstitutional. Constitutional 
doctrine does not necessarily have to aim towards consistency. However, in the context of setting out a 
fairness constraint to a criminal justice system it would seem that creating uniform outcomes is desirable. 
In addition, the ex-post-facto doctrine is aimed at limiting the power of legislatures. Thus, legal doctrine 
should be tailored to deal with a legislature that wishes to abuse its power. Under this premise the 
evaluation of legislative intent through mechanical instruments such as the stated intent of the legislature 
and the place in which the statute was codified, would only set out a road map for legislatures to immunize 
legislation from ex-post-facto review. For a general argument for focusing on the effect of SORNLs rather 
then the underlying legislative intent see Note, Prevention Versus Punishment: Toward a Principled 
Distinction in the Restraint of Released Sex Offenders, 109 HARV. L. REV. 1711, 1725-8 (1996). 
Another problem with the Smith ruling has to do with the fact that the Court based its conclusion 
of a non-punitive intent in part on a lack of procedural safeguards in the Alaska Act. This type of reasoning 
is, at best, problematic. Holding a law constitutional because it does not offer defendants rights and 
protections only gives legislatures incentives not to grant defendants such rights in future cases. It is 
unclear why courts would want to give legislatures this type of incentives. 
 
229 Smith, 538 U.S. at 101. 
 
230 E.B., 119 F.3d at 1099-1100 (noting that the dissemination of accurate information when done in 
furtherance of a legitimate governmental interest cannot be considered to be punishment); Femedeer v. 
Haun, 227 F.3d 1244 (10th Cir. 2000) (stating that dissemination of information about criminal activity 
“has never been regarded as punishment when done in furtherance of a legitimate governmental interest”); 
Cutshall v. Sundquist, 193 F.3d 466, 475 (6th Cir. 1999) (arguing that the dissemination of information 
should not be viewed as punishment). 
 
231 See supra  Section II 1. 
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prevention and have much more to do with reciprocity and a norm of sanctioning. 232 
Justice Souter, while not using the signaling terminology employed here, understood the 
social process that might be triggered by creating a focal point surrounding sex offenders, 
when he noted that: 
 
While the Court accepts the State's explanation that the Act simply makes 
public information available in a new way, the scheme does much more. 
Its point, after all, is to send a message that probably would not otherwise 
be heard, by selecting some  conviction information out of its corpus of 
penal records and broadcasting it with a warning. Selection makes a 
statement, one that affects common reputation and sometimes carries 
harsher consequences, such as exclusion from jobs or housing, 
harassment, and physical harm. 233 
 
Regretfully, the Court did not incorporate this insight into its holding in Smith, and based 
its ruling on a misconception of the nonlegal sanctions created by SORNLs.234 
 
Finally, it should be noted that the ruling of the Court in Smith is not aligned with 
the general approach courts have taken towards disseminating truthful information about 
past criminal activities. State courts have been dealing for a long period of time with 
probation conditions that include an element of public notification. Generally, states 
allow judges to set probation conditions that promote the rehabilitation of offenders and 
the safety of the community, but forbid them from imposing additional punitive 
measures.235 In some jurisdictions proactive judges have tried to use this authority to 
impose conditions that disseminated to the public information about the crimes 
committed by offenders. Yet, offenders subjected to such conditions have argued 
successfully that these conditions are punitive, and therefore are beyond the scope of the 
court’s authority while setting probation conditions. 
 
                                                 
232 See supra  Section III 3. 
233 Smith, 538 U.S. 109 (Justice Souter, concurring in the judgment, internal citation omitted). For a similar 
view see Noble v. Board of Parole and Post-Prison Supervision, 964 P.2d 990, 995 (Or. 1998) (noting that a 
sex offender has a liberty interest “in knowing when the government is moving against you and why it has 
singled you out for special attention”). 
 
234 Interestingly, a few weeks after releasing its decision in Smith the Supreme Court released its decision in 
Lawrence, which struck down sodomy laws. One of the points made by the Court in Lawrence was that 
adults engaged in consensual acts of sodomy might be subjected to the adverse affects of SORNLs in at 
least four states. See Lawrence, 123 S.Ct. 2472, 2482. Clearly, if SORNLs only cause reactions that can be 
associated with precautions the courts’ concern is unfounded. Members of communities into which such 
offenders will move into will understand that they pose no risk, and will not subject them to any kind of 
undes ired treatment. Nevertheless, as the court intuitively realizes, inclusion in a sex offender registry has 
far more implications.  
 
235 For example, in Montana the authority of judges to impose conditions at sentencing is limited to those 
conditions that are “necessary to obtain the objectives of rehabilitation and the protection of the victim and 
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For example, in Montana v. Mohammad236 the offender was required by the 
District Court judge to post on every entrance a sign stating “CHILDREN UNDER THE 
AGE OF 18 ARE NOT ALLOWED BY COURT ORDER.”237 Recognizing the potential 
devastating effect such a sign might have on the life of the offender, the Montana 
Supreme Court found that it was punitive, and therefore outside of the authority of the 
district court.238 This line of reasoning was also followed by the Tennessee Supreme 
Court in State v. Burdin.239 In Burdin the Court evaluated a probation condition that was 
imposed on a defendant who was convicted of sexual battery of a 16-year-old victim. The 
condition required the defendant to place in the front yard his residence a four-by-eight 
foot sign with black letters over a yellow background stating: “Warning, all children. 
Wayne Burdin is an admitted and convicted child molester. Parents beware.”240 The 
Burdin Court found that under Tennessee law the primary goal of probation conditions is 
rehabilitation, and courts cannot impose additional punishments that are beyond that 
goal.241 Thus, the court ruled that the district court was unauthorized to set the condition 
described above.242 Generally, the Muhammad and Burdin rulings reflect the majority 
view among courts on this issue.243 Furthermore, even states that did find these measures 
to be lawful did so while acknowledging their punitive nature. For instance, in Lindsay v. 
State244 the Florida district court of appeals evaluated the legality of a probation condition 
                                                 
236 309 Mont. 1 (Mont. 2002). 
 
237 Id. at 4. This sing is not equivalent to the regime created by SORNLs since on one hand it does not 
explicitly identify the released offender as a sex offender, while it informs people of a court order rather 
than a past offense. Furthermore, unlike SORNLs that are mostly based on Internet notification this case 
involves physical signs. Nevertheless, one can assume that the actual effects of this sign was quite similar 
to that of SORNLs since its inevitable outcome was to inform the neighbors of the offender about his past 
sex crimes. 
 
238 Id. at 12 (noting that the condition is “unduly severe and punitive to the point of being unrelated to 
rehabilitation…the effect of such a scarlet letter condition tend to overshadow any possible rehabilitative 
potential that it may generate”). 
 
239 924 S.W.2d 82 (Tenn.1996). 
 
240 Id. at 84. 
 




243 See Muhammad 309 Mont. at 12 (noting that the opinion of the court reflects the opinion of most 
jurisdictions). For additional examples of such rulings see, e.g., People v. Meyer 176 Ill. 2d 372 (Ill. 1997) 
(Illinois Supreme Court held that a probation condition requiring a violent felon to post a 4- foot by 8-foot 
warning sign that will state with 8-inch high letters “VIOLENT FELON” at each entrance to his property is 
an unreasonable form of shaming); People v. Letterlough, 86 N.Y.2d 259 (N.Y. 1995) (New-York Court of 
Appeals holding that a probation condition requiring defendant to affix to any car he drove two signs which 
state in fluorescent, large block letters “CONVICTED DWI” is an unauthorized form of punishment). But 
see Ballenger v. State, 210 Ga.App. 627, 629 (Ga.App. 1993) (upholding a probation condition that 
required the defendant to wear a pink fluorescent bracelet imprinted with the words “D.U.I. CONVICT”).  
 
244 606 So.2d 652 (Fla. App. 1992). 
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that required a defendant to place an ad regarding his DUI conviction in a local 
newspaper.245 The Lindsay Court noted that Florida law allows judges to impose punitive 
probation conditions.246 Thus, the court found that despite the fact that the condition was 
punitive, it was valid under Florida law. 247 
 
While one might argue that these cases deal with sanctions that are harsher than 
those created by SORNLs, it would seem that the main point of these measures continues 
to be the dissemination of truthful information regarding past criminal activity. Unlike 
the Smith Court, the rulings reviewed above simply acknowledged the humiliating nature 
of public notification, and its resemblance to historical forms of punishment.248 
 
In sum, applying the punitive approach towards SORNLs leads to the conclusion 
that these laws should not be applied retroactively. Withholding the application of these 
laws to a well-defined group of offenders, who committed their crimes prior to the 
enactment of these laws, seems to be a small price to pay in order to sustain the moral 
constraint of the ex post facto clause.249  
 
2. Substantive Limitations on the Use of SORNLs as a Sanctioning Tool 
A second line of arguments brought forward by sex offenders against SORNLs 
challenges their general validity rather than their validity towards a specific group of 
offenders. The two main arguments made in this context are that SORNLs represent an 
unconstitutional deprivation of privacy, and that they are a form of cruel and unusual 
punishment. I will begin by evaluating offenders’ privacy claims. 
 
                                                 
245 Id. at 654. 
246 Id. at 656. 
 
247 Id. (noting that “the idea that this condition of probation is improper simply because it is punitive is 
belied by both the statute and the cases”). 
 
248 See Meyer, 176 Ill. 2d at 382 (“The sign contains a strong element of public humiliation or ridicule 
because it serves as a formal, public announcement of the defendant’s crime”); Muhammad, 309 Mont. at 
12 (viewing a notification condition as a “scarlet letter condition”); Letterlough, 86 N.Y. 2d at 266 (“public 
disclosure of a person's crime, and the attendant humiliation and public disgrace, has historically been 
regarded strictly as a form of punishment”). 
 
249 The distinction between punitive and preventative measures presented in this subsection can also be 
applied to legal sanctions created by SORNLs. Some SORNLs include legal limitations on the lives of sex 
offenders such as barring offenders from working in schools and childcare facilities (see MINN. STAT. §§ 
2444.052(sub.3)(k), (sub.4) (1999); OKLA. ST . ANN. § 589 (prohibiting offenders from working in business 
that provide service to children and schools); ALA CODE § 15-20-26(a) (prohibiting offenders from working 
within 2,000 feet of a school or a child care facility)), or limiting the places in which offenders may reside 
(see MINN. STAT . ANN. § 244.052 (subd 4a) (b) (prohibiting property owners from knowingly renting a 
room to level three sex offenders if that owner has an agreement with an agency that provides shelter to 
victims of domestic abuse); OKLA. ST . ANN. § 590 (prohibiting offenders from residing within a two 
thousand foot radius of any school or educational institution); ALA CODE § 15-20-26 (establishing a list of 
limitations on the places in which sex offenders may reside)). Such limitation should not pose any serious 
problem from an ex post facto perspective as long as they are tailored in a narrow way that reflects the type 
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Generally, offenders have been unsuccessful bringing forward claims based on 
the privacy argument. The third, sixth, and ninth circuits have all dealt to some extent 
with privacy arguments made with respect to SORNLs, and all chose to reject them. 250 Of 
these cases it would seem that the line of cases rising out of the third circuit requires an 
extended evaluation, given that it offers the most extensive  analysis of offenders’ privacy 
claims thus far. Paul I and Paul II deal with the pre-Internet notification era. The 
plaintiffs in Paul I were classified as tier 2 and tier 3 sex offenders.251  As such, under 
New Jersey law at the time, they were subjected to public notification. 252 In dealing with 
the privacy argument made by the plaintiffs, the Court first found that there is no privacy 
limitation regarding notifying the public of offenders’ criminal records.253 Nevertheless, 
the Court did find that offenders have some nontrivial privacy interest in preventing the 
publication of their home address.254 Having found this privacy interest, the Court still 
rejected the offenders’ privacy claim due to the compelling governmental interest in 
preventing future sex crimes.255 The Court did, however, remand the case to the District 
Court to determine whether the law in question was applied in such a way that assures 
that the information was disclosed only to parties who have a particular need for it.256 
This later issue was eventually disposed of in Paul II, in which the Court held that New 
Jersey’s guidelines for the implementation of its SORNL limited notification to those 
individuals who had a need for the information, and therefore did not violate offenders’ 
privacy rights.257 
 
Given the court’s decisions in Paul I and Paul II, which upheld notification based 
on its limited application, offenders embarked on a new challenge against New Jersey’s 
SORNL once it shifted to wide ranged Internet notification. Yet in A.A. ex rel. M.M. v. 
New Jersey258 this challenge met an unsympathetic court. In its decision in A.A. the Court 
emphasized the importance of wide dissemination of information to the general public in 
order to prevent future crimes,259 and ruled that the state’s interest in expanding 
notification outweighed any privacy interest of offenders.260   
                                                 
250 See Paul v. Verniero, 170 F.3d 396 (3d Cir.1999) (upholding the New Jersey SORNL against privacy 
challenges) [hereinafter: Paul I]; Paul v. Farmer, 227 F.3d 98 (3d Cir. 2000) (same) [hereinafter: Paul II]; 
A.A. v. New Jersey, 341 F.3d 206 (3d Cir. 2003) (same); Cutshall, 193 F.3d at 480-2 (rejecting privacy 
arguments made against the Tennessee SORNL); Russell v. Gregorie, 124 F.3d 1079, 1093-4 (9th 
Cir.1997) (rejecting privacy claims with respect to Washington’s SORNL). But see Doe v. Otte, 248 F. 3d 
832, 850 note 18 (2001) (limiting the scope of Russell). 
 




253 Id. at 403. 
 




256 Id. at 406. 
 
257 Paul II, 227 F.3d at 107. 
 
258 341 F.3d 206 (N.J. 2003). 
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Several commentators have criticized the rulings rejecting the privacy arguments 
made by sex offenders.261 Generally, these commentators argue that sex offenders, like 
any other type of offender, have a reasonable expectation to keep their criminal past 
private so they can embark on a new life upon release from prison. 262 Furthermore, these 
commentators point out the unclear success of SORNLs in preventing future crimes.263 
Thus, they argue that in balancing between sex offender’s privacy rights and the states’ 
interest in preventing future crimes the former should prevail.264 
 
The punitive approach towards SORNLs points out that the debate surrounding 
offender’s privacy rights should take a different direction. Rather than focusing on the 
appropriate balance between offenders’ privacy rights and the states’ interest in crime 
prevention, we should focus on the question to what extent may states infringe on 
offenders’ privacy rights in order to punish them. Once the debate is framed in such a 
manner, the rulings upholding SORNLs against privacy challenges seem to be justifiable. 
The public has a strong interest in punishing sex offenders that includes fulfilling a 
societal need for reciprocity and deterring future crimes. Thus, while there might be a 
limitation on the ability of states to strip individuals of their privacy in order to punish 
them, given the importance of punishing sex offenders it would seem reasonable to 
conclude that the interest SORNLs serve outweighs the privacy interests of offenders.  
 
Despite the fact that adopting the punitive approach towards SORNLs seems to 
lead to the same conclusion courts have reached, adopting it is of importance for two 
reasons. First, in order to uphold SORNLs some courts are willing to read privacy rights 
in a narrow way, finding that sex offender’s privacy rights were never violated by 
SORNLs.265 Such a finding is troublesome. The dramatic lowering of search costs for the 
public, coupled with the computation of information that includes offender’s home 
address does represent an invasion of the most private space of sex offenders, and should 
be viewed as an invasion of privacy. Second, courts willing to recognize a privacy 
                                                                                                                                                 
259 Id. at 212. 
 
260 Id. at 213. Interestingly, the Court in A.A. cited in this context the Supreme Court’s ruling in Smith, 
which had nothing to do with the question whether SORNLs violate a constitutional right to privacy (id.). 
This might indicate the fact that the Smith ruling has far wider implications than its limited content and that 
it will serve as a general authority to reject claims made by sex offenders. 
 
261 See, e.g., Tara L. Wayt, Megan’s Law: A Violation of the Right to Privacy, 6 TEMP . POL. & CIV. RTS L. 
REV. 139, 149-153 (1997) (arguing that the New Jersey Supreme Court misapplied the right to privacy in 
Poritz); Lewis, supra note 8 at 96-102 (arguing that SORNLs may be unconstitutional on privacy grounds); 
Houston, supra  note 36 at 762-4 (arguing that public notification with respect to sex offenders that do not 
pose a serious risk might be unconstitutional). 
 
262 Lewis, id. at 96-7. 
 




265 See, e.g., Cutshall, 193 F.3d at 480; Russell, 124 F.3d at 1093-4. 
51
Teichman:
Published by University of Michigan Law School Scholarship Repository, 2004
SEX, SHAME, AND THE LAW 51 
interest are engaging in a rather limited evaluation of the public interest that supposedly 
justifies the limitation of that interest, and accept as a given that SORNLs are a key 
component in preventing future sex crimes.266 Yet due to the dramatic effects of SORNLs 
on the privacy of offenders and their questionable preventative value,267 one would 
expect a far more rigorous evaluation of the public interest invoked to justify them. 
 
A second argument sex offenders raise challenging the validity of SORNLs is that 
these laws are unconstitutiona l since they constitute cruel and unusual punishment.268 
Similar arguments are made by legal scholars, who tend to focus their attention on the 
vigilante attacks caused by SORNLs.269 Thus far since the majority of courts have found 
that SORNLs do not constitute punishment, they have also rejected claims that SORNLs 
constitute cruel and unusual punishment.270 From the perspective of the punitive 
approach towards SORNLs the conclusion that these laws are generally not cruel and 
unusual punishment is desirable. Despite the harsh effects SORNLs bring on offenders 
there seems to be no reason to view these punitive effects as exceptionally cruel, 
especially when compared to the alternative sanction, namely, imprisonment.271  
 
To be sure, there might be specific types of public shaming that could be viewed 
as cruel and unusual punishment since they contradict the common moral values of 
                                                 
266 See, e.g., A.A ., 341 F.3d at 211-13 (recognizing “the State's interest in expanding the reach of its 
notification to protect additional members of the public”). 
 
267 See supra  Section III 2. 
 
268 The Eighth Amendment provides that “[e]xcessive bails shall not be required, nor excessive fines 
imposed, nor cruel and unusual punishment inflicted”. See U.S. CONST . Amend. VIII. 
 
269 See, e.g ., Andrea L. Fischer, Florida’s Community Notification of Sex Offenders on the Internet: The 
Disregard of Constitutional Protection to Sex Offenders, 45 CLEV. ST . L. REV. 505, 523-30 (1997); Bedarf, 
supra  note 53 at 936-9 (arguing that SORNLs constitute cruel and unusual punishment because they 
degrading); Michele L. Earl-Hubbard, The Child Sex Offender Registration Laws: The Punishment, Liberty 
Depravation, and Unintended Results Associated with the Scarlet Letter Laws of the 1990s, 90 NW. L.  
REV. 788, 820-6 (1996) (arguing that SORNLs constitute cruel and unusual punishment because vigilante 
acts are a foreseeable result of such laws); G. Scott Rafshoon, Community Notification of Sex Offenders: 
Issues of Punishment, Privacy, and Due Process, 44 EMROY L. J. 1633, 1668-71 (1995) (same). But see 
Houston, supra note 36 at 747-756 (arguing that SORNLs are a legitimate way to promote public safety 
and do not constitute cruel and unusual punishment). 
 
270 See, e.g ., Cutshall , 193 F.3d at 477. But see In re Reed, 663 P.2d 216 (Cal. 1983) (finding that requiring 
a defendant convicted of soliciting lewd or dissolute conduct to register as a sex offender constitutes cruel 
and unusual punishment under the California Constitution). Recently, the California Supreme Court 
overruled Reed in In re Leon Casey Alva, 92 P.3d 311 (Cal. 2004). Yet one should note that the discussion 
in Alva was limited to the question wheather registration constitutes cruel and unusual punishment. Id. at 
313. Thus, it is still not clear wheather the enactment of a widespread notification program will be 
constitutional under California law.  
 
271 See supra  notes 68-69 and accompanying text. 
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society. 272 Such values are based on a variety of political theories, such as human dignity 
or the disutility caused to the general public by the humiliation of a fellow member of the 
community.  For instance, one might argue that the provisions of the Louisiana SORNL 
authorizing courts to order offenders to wear t-shirts and post signs outside their homes 
that indicate their status as sex offenders represent a type of humiliation that is 
unacceptable. Evaluating exactly which types of notification should be viewed as 
unacceptable should therefore be done on a case by case basis, and is beyond the scope of 
this Article. 
 
In sum, the punitive approach towards SORNLs might be bad news for offenders 
as to the viability of their arguments relating to the general validity of these laws, since it 
sees nothing inherently wrong with publicly shaming people in order to punish them. 
Nevertheless, adopting this approach could be good news for those who wish to protect 
individual rights, since it does recognize the harsh effects of these laws. 
 
3. Procedural Due Process: The Right of Sex Offenders to Risk Assessment 
Hearings Prior to Public Notification 
A common argument raised by sex offenders is that automatic registration and 
notification without a prior individual evaluation of the risk of recidivism violates 
offenders’ due process rights under the Fourteenth Amendment.273 According to this 
argument, the harsh reputational effects of notification, coupled with the burden of 
registration, constitute a liberty interest that requires legislatures to give offenders a 
chance to demonstrate that they represent a low risk of re-offending. As a matter of 
existing law, the Jacob Wetterling Act does not require individual risk assessments, and 
states differ on this issue.274  
 
Courts have been divided in their treatment of offenders’ due process claims. 
While the majority of courts, at both the state and the federal level, have rejected these 
claims,275 several influential decisions have found that SORNLs - and especially the ir 
notification provisions - infringe on a liberty interest of offenders, and require a holding 
                                                 
272 Courts have generally held that the Eighth Amendment creates a moral limitation on the types of 
punis hments that can be used. See, e.g ., Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 100 (U.S. 1958) (noting that the basic 
principle underlying the Eighth Amendment is human dignity); Weems v. United States, 217 U.S. 349, 378 
(U.S. 1910) (noting that the Eighth Amendment “may acquire meaning as public opinion becomes 
enlightened by a humane justice”). 
 
273 The Fourteenth Amendment provides that “no person shall be deprived of life, liberty, or property 
without due process of law.” U.S. CONST . amend. XIV, §1. 
 
274 See supra  notes 116-119 and accompanying text. 
 
275 See, e.g ., Cutshall, 193 F.3d at 478-80 (Sixth Circuit upholding Tennessee SORNL against a due 
process challenge); Milks v. State, 848 So.2d 1167 (Fla. 2d DCA 2003) (Florida appellate court upholding 
state’s SORNL against a due process challenge); State v. Wilkinson, 9 P.3d 1 (Kan. 2000) (The Kansas 
Supreme Court upholding the state’s SORNL against a due process challenge); Boutin v. LaFleur, 591 
N.W.2d 711, 718-9 (Minn. 1999) (The Minnesota Supreme Court upholding the state’s SORNL against a 
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of a risk assessment hearing. 276 At the same time, a vibrant academic debate has evolved 
on this question. 277 Given the divergence of opinions on the matter, including the 
difference of opinion between the Second and the Sixth Federal Circuit Courts of 
Appeal, 278 the Supreme Court recently took the matter under consideration.279  
 
On the same day the Supreme Court handed down its ruling in Smith it also 
handed down its ruling in Connecticut Department of Public Safety v. Doe.280 In this 
ruling, the Court evaluated the constitutionality of the Connecticut SORNL against a 
procedural due process challenge. The Connecticut SORNL applies to all individuals 
convicted of several sex crimes and crimes against minors,281 while generally making no 
distinctions among different offenders according to their potential risk of re-offending.282 
Given this policy, the Respondent, Doe, argued that since he does not pose a high risk of 
re-offending, the Connecticut SORNL deprives him of a liberty interest – his reputation – 
by including his name in a sex offender registry without granting him meaningful 
opportunity to be heard.283 
                                                 
276 See, e.g ., Doe v. Department of Public Safety ex rel. Lee, 271 F.3d 38 (2nd Cir. 2001) (Second Circuit 
striking down Connecticut’s SORNL on due process grounds); State v. Bani, 36 P.3d 1255 (Hawai'i, 2001) 
(The Supreme Court of Hawaii finding that the state’s SORNL violates the state’s due process clause); 
Espindola v. State, 885 So.2d 1281 (Fla. 2003) (Florida appellate court striking down the state’s SORNL 
on due process grounds). In New Jersey the Supreme Court also found that the states SORNL violated 
offenders’ due process rights. See Doe v. Poritz, 662 A.2d 367, 417-22 (N.J.1995). In order to uphold the 
law the Court then read into the law a requirement for a judicial hearing (id. at 381-5). 
 
277 See, e.g., Jennifer G. Daugherty, Sex Offender Registration Laws and Procedural Due Process: Why 
Doe v. Department of Public Safety ex rel. Lee Should be Overturned, 26 HAMLINE L. REV. 713 (2003) 
(arguing that SORNLs should not be struck down on due process grounds);  Logan, supra note 164 at 1167 
(arguing that sex offenders’ due process rights should be guarded); Small, supra note 8 at 1451 (concluding 
that an individual fact specific risk evaluation should be conducted with respect to each offender); 
Rafshoon, supra  note 269 at 1671-3 (arguing that offenders subjected to notification should be provided 
with a hearing). 
 
278 Compare Doe, 271 F.3d 38 with Cutshall, 193 F.3d 466. 
 
279 535 U.S. 1077 (U.S. 2002) (granting cert). 
 
280 538 U.S. 1 (U.S. 2003). 
 
281 CONN. STAT . §§ 54-251; 54-252. The Connecticut SORNL also applies to felonies committed for a 
sexual purpose (CONN. STAT . § 54-254), yet Connecticut courts have full discretion regarding the 
application of the SORNL to offenders who were convicted of such felonies. 
 
282 The Connecticut SORNL does make some distinctions among offenders. With respect to the length of 
its application the Connecticut SORNL applies to most offenders for a period of ten years, while those 
convicted of sexually violent offenses must register for life (CONN. STAT . §§ 54-251; 54-252). In addition, 
some very specific types of offenders may be exempt by a court from the requirements of the SORNL. For 
example, an offender convicted of sexual intercourse with a minor aged between 13 and 16 while the 
offender was no more than two years older than the minor, and provided that the offender was younger than 
19, may be exempt from the requirements of the law if a court finds that registration is not required for the 
protection of the public’s safety (CONN. STAT . § 54-251(c)). 
 
283 Connecticut Department of Public Safety, 538 U.S. at 5-6. 
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In a brief ruling, with no dissenting voices, the Court upheld the Connecticut 
SORNL. The Court opened its analysis by pointing out that “sex offenders are a serious 
threat” and that they are “much more likely than any other type of offender to be re-
arrested for a new rape or sex assault.”284 Having said that, the Court turned to find that 
the Connecticut SORNL does not deprive registrants of their due process rights since the 
sole touchstone for registration under it was prior convictions, and it did not categorize 
all sex offenders as dangerous.285 Furthermore, as noted by the Court, the notification 
website operated by the state explicitly stated that the Connecticut Department of Public 
Safety “has made no determination that any individual included in the registry is 
currently dangerous.”286 Thus, since the issue of an individual’s dangerousness is not a 
relevant factor according to the Connecticut SORNL, there is no reason to conduct any 
kind of hearing prior to registration. 287 
 
As was the case with respect to Smith, the unwillingness of the Court in 
Connecticut Department of Public Safety to face the reality brought about by SORNLs 
leads it to a problematic decision. The Court ignores the fact that the mere inclusion in a 
sex offender registry creates detrimental effects on the reputation of these individuals. As 
we have seen, the reaction of communities to inclusion in registries goes beyond taking 
preventative measures based on the dangerousness of offenders, and reflects punitive acts 
that are based on the status of sex offenders as such. 288  
 
The punitive approach towards SORNLs offers a far more consistent and 
persuasive view on the issue of offenders’ right to a risk assessment hearing. This 
approach recognizes the stigmatizing effect of including individuals in a sex offender 
registry. Nevertheless, since the focal point of this approach is punishing offenders for 
their past acts it finds no necessity in evaluating the future dangerousness of a specific 
offender. Rather, the only relevant hearing from this perspective is the sentencing hearing 
of the offender after he was found guilty. 289  
 
Again, as was the case with respect to offender’s substantive due process 
arguments, the punitive approach towards SORNLs does not reflect much optimism as to 
the viability of the procedural arguments brought forward by offenders. Adopting this 
approach, however, is of importance since unlike the Court’s reasoning in Connecticut 
                                                 
284 Id. at 4 (quoting McKune v. Lile, 536 U.S. 24 (2002)). 
 
285 Id. at 7-8. 
 




288 See supra  Section III 3. 
 
289 In fact, at least one court has explicitly followed this line of reasoning. See Wilkinson, 9 P.3d at 8 
(noting that “the only procedural due process to which Wilkinson was entitled was the process required to 
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Department of Public Safety, it does acknowledge the actual effects of SORNLs. 
SORNLs do represent the awesome power the state holds in stigmatizing a specific group 
of people, and its use of this power should be limited by procedural safeguards.290 
 
4. Reintegrating Sex Offenders  
As we have seen above, shame sanctions in general, and SORNLs in particular, 
might have the perverse effect of increasing the crime rate of the shamed group.291 
Legislatures who accept this result as a given, must evaluate the advantages of creating 
an efficient regime of general deterrence and the problems of increased criminality 
among a specific group. One might conjecture that the benefits of general deterrence are 
far reaching, and outweigh any specific deterrence consideration, yet at the end of the day 
that is an empirical question. Legislatures, however, should not accept this problem as a 
given. Rather, they should aim to design a regime that will inflict painful sanctions while 
minimizing the problems associated with shaming. This goal can be achieved by allowing 
for the reintegration of offenders into society. In this subsection I will present policy 
recommendations that will assist to construct such a regime. 
 
A first point of contention regarding the current state of SORNLs has to do with 
the duration of registration and notification. The Jacob Wetterling Act requires offenders 
who were convicted of aggravated offences or who were convicted more than once, to 
register for life, with no possibility of relief from this requirement.292 Furthermore, since 
the Jacob Wetterling Act only sets out minimum requirements, some states have created 
harsher rules, requiring all offenders to register for life with no possibility of relief. 293 
This type of sanctioning is undesirable from the perspective of marginal deterrence, since 
it condemns offenders to a life of stigmatisation with no possibility of gaining new social 
capital. As one offender put it, before he committed suicide, “I have no hope … What is 
left for me? I will be subject to Megan’s Law for the rest of my life.”294 A policy 
                                                 
290 It should be noted that the fact the punitive approach towards SORNLs does not require a risk 
assessment for offenders does not indicate whether such an evaluation is  desirable or not. On one hand, 
clearly a central part of the effectiveness of SORNLs as a sanctioning device is the public perception of 
high risks that are associated with registered offenders. From that perspective, one might conjecture that 
risk assessment hearings are a useful tool to generate higher nonlegal sanctions towards offenders. On the 
other hand, conducting such hearings is costly and will eventually lower the amount of people that are 
subjected to these laws and thus reduce the use of nonlegal sanctions. Evaluating this tradeoff depends on 
empirical data that does not exist at this point in time. Yet in any event one should notice that making this 
tradeoff is a legislative matter that should not raise significant constitutional questions. 
 
291 See supra  notes 54-67 and accompanying text and Section III 4. 
 
292 42 U.S.C. § 14071(b)(6)(B). The Final Guidelines explicitly state that “[a] state is not in compliance 
with subsection (b)(6)(B) (i) or (ii) if it has a procedure or authorization for terminating the registration of 
convicted offenders within the scope of these provisions at any point in their lifetimes”. See The Final 
Guidelines, supra  note 103 at 582. 
 
293 See MO. REV. STAT . § 589.400. 3 (setting out lifetime registration for all offenders); S.C. CODE § 23-3-
460 (same). 
 
294 New Jersey Public Defender Amici Brief, supra  note 143 at 22. 
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sensitive to marginal deterrence considerations would allow for the removal of offenders 
from the registry after a specified period of time that reflects a socially desired level of 
sanctioning, if they have met certain requirements that will motivate them to refrain from 
criminal activity, such as having clean police records.295 Creating a finite registration and 
notification period will give offenders something to lose, and will enable policymakers to 
utilise nonlegal sanctions to deter future crimes.296 
 
The case for a finite registration and notification period might be phrased in 
constitutional terms. The Court has yet to make a clear connection between the concept 
of marginal deterrence and the Eighth Amendment. Nevertheless, reviewing some of the 
cases in which the Court was willing to strike down punishments demonstrates that 
marginal deterrence intuitions might be driving at least some of its decisions. This 
connection can be seen through the way the Court has read a proportionality requirement 
into the Eighth Amendment’s prohibition of cruel and unusual punishment.297 In Coker v. 
Georgia,298 for example, the Supreme Court struck down on proportionality grounds a 
Georgia law that allowed the imposition of the death penalty on rapists.299 Though the 
court never used marginal deterrence theory in order to explain its ruling, this decision is 
in line with such a theory of punishment. Imposing the death penalty on rapists would 
give rapists an incentive to kill their victims, since by doing so they would be facing the 
same sanction while the probability of detection given the elimination of the (usually) 
sole witness to the crime would be reduced.300 Similarly, some of the concerns of courts 
regarding three-strike laws can be framed in terms of marginal deterrence. Under these 
laws offenders convicted for the third time of certain crimes are subject to harsh 
mandatory sanctions.301 For instance, In Solem v. Helm,302 the Court evaluated a life 
                                                 
295 Some states wanted to opt for such a regime. For example, the Florida SORNL provides for judicial 
review of the registration requirement twenty years after the initial registration. See FLA. STAT . § 
943.0435(11). Yet since this provision subjects itself to the limitations made by the Jacob Wetterling Act 
offenders in Florida cannot currently ask for such relief. 
296 To be sure, the mere fact that the registration comes to an end will not necessarily bring nonlegal 
sanctions to an end since the community will continue to hold the information that was disseminated by the 
SORNL. Nevertheless, the moment the law stops to operate the offender does at the very least have an 
opportunity to move to a different community in order to start a new life with no nonlegal sanctions. 
 
297 Weems, 217 U.S. at 378 (“punishment for crime should be graduated and proportioned to offense”). 
 
298 433 U.S. 584, 592 (U.S. 1977) (concluding that “a sentence of death is grossly disproportionate and 
excessive punishment for the crime of rape and is therefore forbidden by the Eighth Amendment as cruel 
and unusual punishment”). 
 
299 It should be noted that Coker does not represent a complete ban on the imposition of the death penalty 
on sexual crimes that do not involve murder. See Louisiana v. Bethley, 685 So.2d 1063 (La. 1996) 
(upholding a Louisiana statute allowing the death penalty when the victim of a rape was less than twelve 
years of age); cert denied Bethley v. Louisiana, 520 U.S. 1259 (Mem) (U.S. 1997). 
 
300 The assumption of a reduced probability of detection presupposes that law enforcement agencies devote 
equal resources to the investigation of rapes that do not involve murder and rapes in which the victim was 
murdered. In as much as this is not the case and law enforcement agencies increase their investigation 
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sentence without the possibility of parole imposed on a repeat offender convicted of 
issuing a no account check for $100.303 The Court struck down this punishment, finding 
that it was completely disproportionate to the crime.304 Again, despite the fact that the 
Court did not base its decision on marginal deterrence grounds, one can point out a 
connection between the theory and the Court’s holding. A sanctioning regime, which 
imposes harsh mandatory sanctions for completely different crimes, erodes marginal 
deterrence. A two strike offender who faces the same sanction for shoplifting a videotape 
and for armed robbery might opt for the later, if his expected payoff from that type of 
crime is higher.  
 
Regretfully, in recent years the Court has limited the scope of the Solem ruling to 
a degree that one can question the viability of Eighth Amendment challenges to any 
incarceration sanction. For instance, in Harmelin v. Michigan the Court upheld a life 
sentence without the possibility of parole for a first time offender who was convicted of 
possessing more than 650 grams of cocaine.305 Given the fact that under such a ruling a 
state could impose a life sentence without the possibility of parole on sex offenders, it 
could also, arguably, require life long registration from such individuals. This trend in 
Eighth Amendment jurisprudence is not necessarily desirable. Punishments that are too 
harsh are not in the best interest of society, and courts, at times, should intervene and 
regulate overly zealous legislatures creating such punishments. 
 
A second policy recommendation aimed towards the reintegration of sex 
offenders is to establish social ceremonies that will reintegrate sex offenders back into 
society, while sustaining the shame inflicting aspects of SORNLs.306 Many cultures that 
rely on shame based sanctions utilize such ceremonies.307 In addition, sophisticated 
modern commercial parties that rely on extralegal sanctions often create similar 
mechanisms.308 In the context of sex offenders some states are turning towards adopting 
                                                                                                                                                 
301 For a comparative description of these laws see John Clark, James Austin, and D. Alan Henry, “Three 




302 463 U.S. 277 (1983). 
303 Solem, Id. at 281-3. 
 
304 Id. at 290. 
 
305 See Harmelin v. Michigan, 501 U.S. 957 (1991). See also Ewing v. California 538 U.S. 11 (2003) 
(upholding a California 25 years to life sentence for stealing merchandise valued at approximately $1,200); 
Lockyer v. Andrade, 538 U.S. 63 (2003) (upholding a California sentence for two consecutive sentences of 
25 to life for two cases of petty theft).  
 
306 For a general theory of shame and reintegration see Braithwaite, supra  note 66 at 54-68. 
 
307 See Id . at 74 (describing reintegration ceremonies in Japan); Massaro, supra  note 6 at 1924 (pointing out 
the importance of reintegration). 
   
308 For example, in her case study of the diamond industry Lisa Bernstein points out that one of the possible 
sanctions that the board of arbitraries of the Diamond Dealers Club is expulsion from the club. Yet as 
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programs of community meetings in which law enforcement officers guide communities 
through the process of notification. 309 Such meetings, which arguably do not diminish the 
shaming of offenders, might assist the reintegration process of offenders.310 
 
Finally, legislatures should create legal protections that will assist offenders to 
establish new social capital. Laws prohibiting discrimination against sex offenders in 
areas such as employment (aside from cases in which such discrimination reflects a 
rational preventative measure due to the specific type of work) and housing, might help 
achieve this goal. Some legislatures have in fact adopted such measures recently.311 
 
5. Plea Agreements 
As we have seen SORNLs might cause prosecutors and defendants to circumvent 
them by using the plea bargaining process.312 Recently, some legislatures aware of this 
behavior have taken steps to prevent it. Upon its enactment in 1991, the Minnesota 
SORNL only required that persons convicted of certain enumerated felony offenses 
register as sex offenders.313 Yet in 1993, the legislature amended the statute to require 
that a person register if he was charged with a registerable offense, and was convicted of 
that offense or “another offense arising out of the same set of circumstances”. 314 Despite 
no clear indication as to the legislative intent behind this amendment, it would seem that 
it was intended to prevent offenders form pleading out of the registration requirements set 
out by the law. 315 The adoption of this amendment is a strong indication that at least in 
Minnesota contracting around SORNLs was a common occurrence.316  
                                                                                                                                                 
Bernstein notes the imposition of such a harsh sanction might create an end game problem. To avoid this 
problem the laws governing the diamond trade allow for the readmition of expelled members after a period 
of two years. This provision is quite literally a reintegration provision. It gives members a carrot in the 
form of potential future membership while giving the Diamond Dealers Club a stick in the form of the 
threat to withhold future readmission. See Bernstein, Diamond Industry, supra note 1 at 129.  
 
309 For a description of these meetings see Richard Z. Zevitz & Mary Ann Farkas, Sex Offender Community 
Notification: Examining the Importance of Neighborhood Meetings, 18 BEHAV. SCI. & L. 393 (2000) 
(reviewing community meetings in Wisconsin); Matson & Lieb, supra note 149 at 10-14 (reviewing 
community meetings in Washington State). 
 
310 Zevitz & Farkas, id. at 405 (noting that community members can assist in the reintegration of offenders 
and can help prevent crime). 
 
311 See supra  note 55. 
 
312 See supra  Section III 5. 
 
313 See Boutin v. LaFleur, 591 N.W.2d 711, 715 (Minn. 1999). 
 
314 MINN. STAT . § 243.166(a)(1). 
 
315 Boutin v. LaFleur, 1998 WL 8486 (Minn. App.  Jan. 13, 1998) at*2 (noting that the Minnesota 
legislature “appears to have intended that offenders such as Boutin not be able to avoid registration as a 
predatory offender by plea bargaining for a lesser or different offense”); Gunderson v. Hvass 339 F.3d 
639, 643-4 (8th Cir. Minn., 2003) (“Given the realities of the plea bargaining system, by extending the 
registration requirements to persons who are charged with a predatory offense, but who plead guilty to a 
non-predatory charge that arises from the same circumstances, the Minnesota legislature was attempting to 
59
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The reactions following the adoption of the Minnesota amendment support the 
insights of the theoretical model. Since the amendment  does not alter the desire of both 
defendants and prosecutors to contract around SORNLs, one can observe that parties are 
trying to circumvent the new constraint created by the amendment. One plausible way to 
do that is by shifting the negotiations to the pre-charge point, before prosecutors become 
committed to triggering the SORNL. Another is by developing procedural loopholes that 
will allow the parties to continue with their contracting practices. In Gunderson the 
defendant was initially charged with a sex offense, yet after the sexual aspects of the 
allegations made by the victim were found to be inconsistent with the findings of the 
police investigation, the prosecutor agreed to plea the case to a nonsexual offense.317 In 
what would seem to be an attempt of the prosecutor and the defense attorney to bypass 
the Minnesota amendment the two agreed that the initial complaint be dismissed in its 
entirety, and that the defendant would plead guilty to a new complaint charging him with 
third degree assault.318 This plan worked initially, but less than a year after sentencing 
Gunderson violated his probation. Soon after, he was informed that he would have to 
register as a sex offender under the “arising out of the same circumstances” scheme. 
Gunderson challenged his registration in federal court, but the court found that the non-
registered offense does not have to be charged in the same complaint as the registerable 
offense, only that the conviction arise from the same set of circumstances, and ruled that 
Gunderson must register.319 
 
Undoubtedly, schemes such as the Minnesota amendment  can make it more 
difficult for prosecutors and defendants to reach plea agreements that circumvent 
SORNLs. Nevertheless, such schemes are undesirable for several reasons. First, as the 
bargaining model presented above demonstrated, prohibiting such agreements might 
actually lower the aggregate sanction sex offenders face. Thus, these schemes might have 
the perverse effect of actually lowering deterrence and creating additional crime. Second, 
limiting plea bargaining does not deal with the underlying incentives to contract around 
SORNLs. Thus, prosecutors and defense attorneys will continue to attempt to develop 
loopholes around these limitations, or circumvent them by shifting negotiations to the 
pre-charge stage. Third, in some cases such schemes might cause judges to avoid 
convicting guilty defendants in order to prevent what they perceive to be an excessive 
sanction. Judges and jurors facing a choice between triggering the SORNL by any 
                                                                                                                                                 
insure the inclusion in the registration rolls, of all predatory offenders, including those who take advantage 
of favorable plea agreements” (quoting the decision of the magistrate judge in the case)). 
 
316 Other states are also considering amending their SORNL to deal with the issue. According to one report 
Maine is considering to allow judges to add to defendant’s records a comment that would indicate the 
existence of an accusation of a sex crime, despite the lack of a conviction. See Hench, supra  note 186. 
 




319 Id. at 642-3. 
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conviction and acquitting the defendant might see the later as a lesser evil.320 Hence, such 
schemes might reduce the number of defendants found guilty, lower aggregate sanctions, 
and limit the information we hold about past criminal acts of sex offenders. Finally, in 
some cases the shift to a lesser offense might not be due to negotiation tactics, but 
because the case became too difficult, or even impossible, to prove. In Boutin, for 
instance, the prosecutors agreed to drop the sexual charges after the victim recanted the 
portion of her story in which she alleged the defendant forced her to have sex. 321 From an 
optimal deterrence perspective, this might not be a bad outcome, since imposing 
sanctions only when defendants’ guilt is proven beyond a reasonable doubt might create a 
problem of under-deterrence.322 Nevertheless, those who cherish the presumption of 
innocence should be concerned about this development.323 
 
Legislatures who wish to avoid SORNLs being circumvented must realize that no 
matter what their intent when they enacted these laws was, defendants view these laws as 
sanctions, and that large mandatory sanctions create circumvention problems. Thus, a 
more prudent policy would be to grant courts discretion as to the application of the 
notification aspects of SORNLs and allow judges to opt out of the notification periods 
proscribed by the law. 324 Such a policy would create transparency in the sanctioning 
process, would allow prosecutors to maximize the deterrence value of their budgets, and 
                                                 
320 In other cases , judges might try to circumvent the limitation themselves. In Minnesota, for instance, 
several Judges have adopted “creative interpretations” of the law in order to avoid what they perceive to be 
excessive sanctions. See, e.g., In Matter of Welfare of J.L.M., 1996 WL 380664 (Minn. App. Jul. 9, 1996) 
(finding that requiring registration in two cases in which defendants admitted to nonsexual offenses after 
being charged with sex offenses is unreasonable and unnecessary and thus exempt defendants from 
registration); Matter of Welfare of M.A.R., 558 N.W.2d 274, (Minn. App. 1997) (reversing a district 
court’s decision to continue a case without a finding of delinquency beyond the period allowed by law in 
order to avoid registration); State v. Krotzer, 548 N.W.2d 252 (Minn. 1996) (staying adjudication and 
declining to accept 19 year-old -boy's third-degree criminal sexual conduct guilty plea in order to avoid 
registration). 
 
321 Boutin, 591 N.W.2d at 713-4. See also Gunderson 339 F.3d at 641 (plea agreement was reached after 
sexual allegation were found to be inconsistent with forensic evidence). 
 
322 Keith N. Hylton & V.S. Khanna, Toward an Economic Theory of Criminal 
Procedure, Discussion Paper No. 318, John M. Olin Center for Law, Economics 
and Business, Harvard Law School, at 20-23 (2001, revised 2004) (available at 
http://www.law.harvard.edu/programs/olin_center/). 
 
323 Judge Randall of the Minnesota Court of Appeals recently voiced a clear opinion on the matter when he 
stated that: 
This is a rare occasion in the history of the United States of America! The presumption 
of innocence embedded in both the U.S. Constitution and the Minnesota Constitution is 
swept aside in favor of a “rule” that says you are “guilty” and must register as a 
predatory sex offender simply because you were “charged” with an offense requiring 
registration, even though that charge did not stick. 
In re Welfare of J.S.K., No. J90150607, 2002 WL 31892086 (Dec. 31, 2002) at*3 
(Randall concurring specially). 
 
324 This recommendation follows recommendations made by commentators with respect to mandatory 
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would help deal with problematic individual cases. Furthermore, there is little reason for 
concern that judges would tend to forgo notification requirements easily since their 
decision will be constrained by the fear that an offender that they will release from the 




This Article dealt with the question whether policymakers that aim to minimize 
the cost of sanctioning should use nonlegal sanctions as a form of punishment. At the 
end of the day my answer to this question is yes, they should, but they should be careful 
about it. The reason for this word of caution is two fold. First, designing a regime that is 
based on legal and nonlegal sanctions requires significant amounts of information with 
respect to the way each of these affects the other. Without such prior information, 
policymakers cannot be sure as to the final outcomes of their policies. Second, extreme 
nonlegal sanctions, like extreme legal sanctions, are a problematic policy tool, and given 
the lower budgetary constraint nonlegal sanctions create for policymakers they might be 
tempted to create harsh nonlegal sanctions. 
 
More specifically, this Article evaluated the treatment of sex offenders under 
public notification laws, and demonstrated that while these programs might have some 
preventative value, their main effects are punitive. Thus, it was argued that courts should 
overcome their reluctance, and recognize the true nature of these laws. The recent 
rulings of the Supreme Court reviewed above, and of other courts that stated explicitly 
that they would not take into account the full scope of nonlegal sanctions created by 
SORNLs,325 raise the concern that courts are willing to turn a blind eye towards the 
actual effects of legislation.  
 
The conclusions of this Article are tentative in nature for the simple reason that 
there is limited empirical data on the issues discussed here. Thus, this Article should not 
be viewed as an artic le attempting to seal the debate over the design of optimal 
sanctions, but rather as an article that continues this discussion. Additional studies that 
could assist to further this discussion include: studies that will offer empirical 
measurements of the way the law effects nonlegal sanctions, studies of plea bargaining 
behavior surrounding the use of nonlegal sanctions, and studies in specific contexts – 
such as the context of sex offenders – that will offer us a better understanding of actual 




This appendix will demonstrate in general terms the claims set out in Section II. 
 
I use the following notation: 
                                                 
325 Russell, 124 F.3d at 1092 (noting that “our inquiry into the law’s effects cannot consider the possible 
‘vigilante’ or illegal responses of citizens to notification”). See also W.P. v. Poritz, 931 F.Supp. 1199, 
1211-12 (D.N.J., 1996) (noting that the scope of the analysis of the effects of the law is limited to legal 
reactions of the public). 
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LS = legal sanctions 
NLS = nonlegal sanctions 
T* = the exogenous level of total sanction set out by the political system  
 
and assume the following continuous convex functions that represent the costs of 
inflicting legal and nonlegal sanctions: 
 
CL = CL (LS), where CL>0, CL’>0, CL’’>0 
CNL = CNL (NLS), where CNL>0, CNL’>0, CNL’’>0 
 
Beginning with the benchmark case, the social optimal combination of sanctions is used 
when the cost of sanctioning is minimized, thus the social planers’ problem can be 
phrased as: 
 
(1) Min: CL(LS) + CNL(NLS) 
           L, NL
 
      s.t.    T* = LS + NLS 
 















Turning to the endogenous case, this case can be represented by noting that the level of 
the legal sanction is a variable within the cost function of nonlegal sanctions. The cost-
minimizing problem will remain unchanged and can be noted as: 
 
(4) Min: CL(LS) + CNL(NLS, LS) 
           L, NL
 
      s.t.    T* = LS + NLS 
 























> 0 (i.e., the substitution case) the optimal level of nonlegal 





 < 0 (i.e. the 
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